

# **Developing future scenarios of demographic, migratory and labour market processes in Austria:**

## **Foresight findings**

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## Zusammenfassung

Wie könnte sich internationale Migration in Österreich bis 2025 entwickeln? Welche Entwicklungspfade sind im kommenden Jahrzehnt vor dem Hintergrund der derzeitigen demographischen und arbeitsmarktrelevanten Prozesse denkbar? Um mögliche zukünftige Entwicklungsperspektiven zu eruieren, wurden im Rahmen eines Szenarienworkshops (Foresight Exercise) organisiert vom Institut für Geographie und Regionalforschung der Universität Wien im Jänner 2014 in Wien migrationsbezogene Szenarien entwickelt. Mit dem Hauptfokus, politische Entscheidungsfindungsprozesse im Themenbereich der internationalen Migration in Österreich zu unterstützen, versuchte der Szenarienworkshop, mögliche Veränderungen und alternative Entwicklungspfade in Bezug auf internationale Wanderung für Österreich bis zum Jahr 2025 aufzuzeigen. Dies wurde mittels einer qualitativ-diskursiven und interaktionsbasierten Methodik, welche die systematische Zusammenführung verschiedenster Perspektiven und Meinungen von ausgewählten SchlüsselakteurInnen (ExpertInnen, EntscheidungsträgerInnen und VertreterInnen der Zivilgesellschaft) ermöglichte, umgesetzt.

Im Rahmen eines eintägigen Workshops, der dazu aufrief aus bewährten Denkmustern auszubrechen, wurden auch ungewöhnliche und weniger naheliegende Gedanken in die Ergebnisfindung eingebettet. Drei zukünftige Migrationsszenarien, ein „rezessives Szenario“, ein „endogene Szenario“ und ein „Wild Card Szenario“ wurden erstellt. Aufgrund des inhärenten Charakters von Szenario-Techniken bildeten die entwickelten Szenarien nicht zwangsläufig wahrscheinliche Entwicklungsverläufe sondern virtuelle mögliche zukünftige Pfade. Obwohl sich die demographischen und ökonomischen Entwicklungsverläufe der drei Szenarien generell unterschieden, konnten allerdings gemeinsame Hauptmerkmale von Migrationsprozessen über alle drei Szenarien hinweg identifiziert werden: Während die Zuwanderung von Arbeitskräften mit wirtschaftlichen, demographischen und sozialen Entwicklungen erheblich variieren würde, zeigen andere Migrationsströme, wie beispielsweise Studierenden- und Familienmigration, fortbestehende Tendenzen, da diese nicht direkt von wirtschaftlichen Konjunkturzyklen beeinflusst werden. Die Schritte, die zur Ergebnisfindung unternommen wurden, werden nun kurz skizziert.

**Haupttriebkkräfte für Wanderung.** In einem ersten Schritt wurden gemeinsam Haupttriebkkräfte für internationale Migration identifiziert. Das konzeptuelle SEEMIG Schema für (Arbeits-)Migration diente als Ausgangspunkt für die Diskussionen. Es schlug die demographische Entwicklung, die zyklische Wirtschaftsentwicklung und die Segmentierung des Arbeitsmarktes als Antriebskräfte für „Nachfrage/Suche nach Arbeitskräften“, sowie öffentliche Meinung und politische Strategien als Antriebskräfte für „staatliches Handeln“ als Schlüsselfaktoren für internationale Migration vor. Die TeilnehmerInnen stimmten dem Modell generell zu, ergänzten es jedoch mit kulturell-ideologischen und politisch-historischen Rahmenbedingungen sowie mit der Einflusskraft von EU-Politiken und Sozialsystemen. Da das Hauptaugenmerk dieses Szenarienworkshops auf Arbeitsmigration gerichtet war, wurde einvernehmlich beschlossen, sich speziell auf die treibenden Kräfte verbunden mit Demographie, wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung und segmentiertem Arbeitsmarkt zu konzentrieren. Um einen gemeinsamen Ausgangspunkt für die Entwicklung der Szenarien zu schaffen, wurden Hauptannahmen über die demographische und wirtschaftliche Ausgangssituation festgelegt.

**Infobox: The SEEMIG project and the context of Work Package 5**

SEEMIG ist ein transnationales Kooperationsprojekt, das von 2012 bis 2014 im Rahmen des Programms SOUTH-EAST EUROPE umgesetzt wird. Um evidenzbasierte Politikgestaltung auf nationaler, regionaler und lokaler Ebene zu fördern, und mit Fokus auf Datenverfügbarkeit und Datenerweiterung, ist das Hauptziel von SEEMIG, die längerfristigen Prozesse im Bereich Migration, Humankapital und Demographie in Südosteuropa sowie deren Auswirkungen auf Arbeitsmärkte und nationale/regionale Wirtschaften zu verstehen.

Im Rahmen des SEEMIG Work Package 5, wurden Bevölkerungsprojektionen für alle SEEMIG-Länder verglichen. Darüber hinaus wurden, basierend auf festgelegten Grundannahmen, eine Reihe von Bevölkerungsprognosen für die Slowakei und für Ungarn erstellt. Für Österreich war diese Vorgehensweise nicht erforderlich, da solche regionalspezifischen Projektionen regelmäßig von der Österreichischen Raumordnungskonferenz zur Verfügung gestellt werden. Zusätzlich wurden qualitative Szenarien-Workshops in acht SEEMIG Ländern, d.h. in Österreich, Bulgarien, Ungarn, Italien, Rumänien, Serbien, der Slowakei und Slowenien veranstaltet, um qualitativ-orientierte Zukunftsperspektiven zu internationaler Migration zu erfassen. Hauptergebnisse dieser Workshops werden in einen Synthesebericht einfließen.

**Sechs Szenarien-Erzählungen.** Basierend auf gemeinsam definierten Annahmen für die drei Hauptszenarien wurden sechs Szenarien-Erzählungen entwickelt. In den beiden expansiven/positiven Szenarien-Erzählungen, die als "Mobilitätsszenario" und "Boom-Szenario" bezeichnet wurden, sind Mobilität und die Durchlässigkeit von Grenzen ein Schlüsselfaktor für die wirtschaftliche und arbeitsmarktbezogene Dynamik; die Nachfrage nach ausländischen Arbeitskräften würde aufgrund wirtschaftlichen Wohlstands und stagnierender natürlicher Bevölkerungsentwicklung, beträchtlich zunehmen. Internationale Migration würde demnach signifikant ansteigen, besonders im Zusammenhang mit Arbeitsmigration, die außerdem durch proaktive migrationspolitische Maßnahmen unterstützt werden würde. Im Gegensatz dazu würden sich die Zuwanderung nach Österreich in den beiden rezessiven/negativen Szenarien-Erzählungen, die als "Skandinavisches-/Schweizer-Szenario" bzw. als „Doom-Szenario" bezeichnet wurden, deutlich verringern, da zusätzliche Arbeitskräfte nur in bestimmten Arbeitsmarktsegmenten benötigt werden würden und eine restriktive nationale Migrationspolitik verfolgt werden würde. In einem „endogenen/Wild-Card-Szenario“ alias „post-koloniales Szenario“ bzw. „Sinking Island-Szenario“, in welchem der Arbeitskräftebedarf durch einheimische Arbeitskräfte gedeckt wird, wäre die Nachfrage nach ausländischen Arbeitskräften sehr gering, was ebenfalls eine rigide Zuwanderungspolitik zur Folge hätte. Während die TeilnehmerInnen sowohl das expansiv/positive als auch rezessiv/negative Szenario für die weitere Entwicklung Österreichs als durchaus „vorstellbar“ hielten, wurde das endogene Szenario als sehr unwahrscheinliches Entwicklung eingestuft. Es liegt nahe, dass sich der wahrscheinlichste und am meisten bevorzugte Verlauf der Entwicklung von Migration in Österreich in den nächsten zehn Jahren zwischen den drei Szenario-Typen bewegt und somit eine Mischung der dargestellten Aspekte darstellt. Aus diesem Grund schien es von Bedeutung, transversale Aspekte aller drei Szenarien zu untersuchen. Denn obwohl die Kennzeichen der drei ausgearbeiteten Szenarien verschiedene dichotome Konnotationen nahelegen, wurden einige gemeinsame Charakteristika, die in allen drei Typen von Szenarien auftraten, offensichtlich.

**Typen der zukünftigen Zuwanderung.** Aufgrund der Nachfrage nach ausländischen Arbeitskräften, zumindest in bestimmten Arbeitsmarktsegmenten, war Arbeitsmigration inhärenter Bestandteil jedes Szenarios. Unabhängig von der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung und der demographischen

Situation Österreichs werden neben Arbeitsmigration in jedem Szenario-Typ auch andere Formen der Zuwanderung erwartet. Beispiele hierfür sind Bildungsmigration und Zuwanderung im Rahmen von Familienzusammenführungen. Diesen Arten von Migration können kaum gesteuert werden, selbst wenn Migrationspolitik Auswirkungen auf ihre Ausgestaltung haben. Weiters wurde angenommen dass Zuwanderung im Kontext von der Suche nach internationalem Schutz in jedem der drei Szenarien weiterhin vorkommen würde. Das tatsächliche Ausmaß und die Zusammensetzung sind in diesem Zusammenhang allerdings nicht vorhersehbar.

**Implikationen für Migrationspolitik.** Die TeilnehmerInnen stellten fest, dass in allen drei Szenarien ein systemischer Ansatz von Nöten ist, um migrationsbezogene politische Herausforderungen in Angriff nehmen zu können. Dieser Umstand betrifft kontrollierbare sowie auch unkontrollierbare Migrationsströme. Aus diesem Grund werden ganzheitliche Ansätze immer wichtiger, da sie mehr Gewicht auf systemische und Querschnitts-Perspektiven legen. In diesem Sinne kann Migrationspolitik nicht als unabhängiges Politikfeld wahrgenommen werden, da es substantiell mit einer Vielzahl an anderen Politikfeldern verflochten ist. Gezielteres Mainstreaming im Bereich Migration und Integration sowie Bewusstseinsbildung erscheinen als zentrale zukünftige Herausforderungen. Im Allgemeinen sollten sich Politiken mehr um eine längerfristige Perspektive bemühen und eine größere systemische und multifokale Konzeptualisierung. Es bedarf einer Gesamtstrategie, die verschiedene mögliche Richtungen und längerfristige Dynamiken reflektiert.

## Executive Summary

How could international migration in Austria evolve until 2025? Which development paths can be imagined in the upcoming decade when taking demographic and labour market processes into account? In order to trace possible future prospects, Migration Future Scenarios were developed in the framework of a Foresight Exercise Workshop organised by the Department for Geography and Regional Research of the University of Vienna in Vienna in January 2014. With the main aim to support decision-making processes in the area of international migration, the foresight exercise aimed at revealing possible changes and alternative future migration paths for Austria until the year 2025 by applying a qualitative discursive and interaction-based methodology. It did so by bringing together different perspectives and expertise from a selected group of key actors representing domain experts, decision makers and civil society, to elaborate mental maps of possible migration futures. By jointly thinking 'outside of the box', in a one-day workshop, three migration future scenarios were developed: an 'expansive scenario', a 'recessive scenario' and an 'endogenous / wild card scenario'. Although Austria is expected to evolve in a completely diverging manner in the single scenarios, some core features of migration appeared across all scenarios: while labour immigration dynamics would indeed substantially vary according to the economic, demographic and social development, other migration flows such as student and family migration show persisting tendencies, as they do not directly depend on economic cycles. The steps undertaken to reach these findings are now briefly outlined.

**Key drivers of migration.** In a first step, key drivers for international migration were jointly identified. The SEEMIG conceptual scheme for (labour) migration was proposed by UNIVIE as a starting point for discussions and suggested demographic development, the cyclical economic development, the segmentation of the labour market as drivers for 'demand/search for labour' as well as public opinion and political strategy as drivers for 'state action' as main drivers for international migration. The participants commonly acknowledged the model and further substantiated it through cultural-ideological or political-historical brackets plus the influencing power of EU policies and welfare systems. As the focus of the foresight exercise was primarily on labour migration, it was consensually decided to particularly focus on driving forces relating to demography, economic development and the segmented labour market. So as to have a common starting point for the development of scenario stories, main assumptions about the demographic and economic points of departure were defined in order to give a common basis to the scenario development.

### ***Infobox: The SEEMIG project and the context of Work Package 5***

SEEMIG is a transnational cooperation project that is being implemented in the framework of the programme SOUTH-EAST EUROPE from 2012-2014. In order to facilitate evidence-based policy-making on the national, regional and local levels, and focusing on data availability and data enhancement, the main objective of SEEMIG is to better understand and address the longer-term migratory, human capital and demographic processes of the SEE area as well as their effects on

In the framework of SEEMIG WP5, data-based population projections are compared for all SEEMIG countries. Furthermore, starting from several basic assumptions, a set of population projections are elaborated for Slovakia and Hungary. For Austria, such regionalised projections are already periodically issued by the Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning.

In addition, for grasping qualitative-oriented future prospects on international migration, Foresight Exercises are conducted for eight SEEMIG countries, i.e. Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. Main outcomes of these

labour markets and national/regional economies.

workshops feed into a comparative report.

**Six scenario stories.** Owing to the inherent character of foresight methods, the developed scenarios constitute virtual paths and as such do not necessarily depict probable developments. Based on the jointly defined assumptions for the three main scenarios as mentioned above, six scenario stories were developed. In the two ‘expansive / positive scenario stories’, which were labelled ‘*Mobility Scenario*’ and ‘*Boom Scenario*’, mobility and the permeability of borders are a key factor for the economic and labour market dynamics; the demand for foreign labour force would significantly increase due to economic prosperity and stagnating natural population development. International immigration would therefore considerably grow, particularly due to labour migration, which would also be supported by pro-active migration policy measures. In contrast, in the two ‘recessive / negative scenario stories’, called ‘*Scandinavian/Swiss Scenario*’ and ‘*Doom Scenario*’, immigration flows would markedly decrease as additional labour force would only be demanded in specific labour market segments. Thus, only restrictive migration policies would be pursued. Finally, in the ‘endogenous / wild card scenario stories’, alias the ‘*Post-colonial Scenario*’ and the ‘*Sinking Island Scenario*’, hardly any room would be given for foreign labour force, as labour shortages could be filled with domestic labour force - implying very rigid immigration policies. While both the ‘expansive / positive scenario’ and the ‘recessive / negative scenario’ were regarded as ‘imaginable’ for the upcoming Austrian development by the participants, the ‘endogenous scenario’ was considered to be a very unlikely development. The most likely and most preferable development for migration in Austria in the next ten years is likely to be situated between the three scenarios types presented hereafter, thus being characterised by a mixture of the displayed aspects. For this purpose, it seems relevant to examine transversal aspects related to all three scenarios. Furthermore, while at first glance, the labels of the three elaborated scenarios suggest distinct dichotomous connotations, a number of such common features that arose across all three types of scenarios became apparent.

**Types of future migration flows.** In all three scenarios, foreign workforce is needed to satisfy domestic labour market demands, at least to specific labour market segments. Apart from labour migration, some further types of immigration are expected to pertain to all three types of scenarios, regardless of Austria’s economic dynamics and demographic situation. Examples in this regard include educational migration and immigration in the context of family reunification. These types of migration can hardly be steered, even if migration policies indeed have effects on their configuration. Also immigration in the context of search for international protection is assumed to occur in each future scenario, however with the exact extent and composition not predictable.

**Implications for migration policies.** Participants found that throughout all three scenarios, a more systemic approach is needed for tackling migration-related policy challenges; this concerns controllable as well as uncontrollable migration flows. Hence, holistic approaches will become increasingly important by giving greater emphasis on systemic and cross-sectional perspectives. In this sense, migration policies cannot be perceived as a stand-alone policy arena, because they are substantially intertwined with a range of other policy arenas. Greater migration and integration mainstreaming as well as awareness-raising seem to be pivotal future challenges. In general, policies should strive more for a longer-term perspective and a greater systemic and multi-focal



conceptualisation. An 'overall strategy' is thus needed that reflects on different possible directions and long-term developments.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

In 2030, approximately nine million people are expected to live in Austria. International migration is assumed to remain the decisive component for population growth. While in 2012 the international migration gain was 43,797, both immigration and emigration are estimated to slightly decline and to reach an annual net migration of 28,809 in 2030. While in 2012 the share of persons born abroad amounted to 16 per cent, one in five residents in Austria will be born abroad in 2030. These are selected core outcomes of the 'main variant scenario' of demographic projections for Austria, issued by *Statistik Austria* in late 2013. However, a look at other projection variants reveals that different paths are also imaginable: for instance according to a 'high migration variant', the population could grow to 9.2 million residents, amounting to an annual international net migration of 41,117. If the 'main variant without migration' is considered, only slight increases could be expected, amounting to 8.3 million residents in 2030.

Hence, the future is hardly predictable as most influencing factors cannot be pre-estimated and cannot be totally comprehended by extrapolating quantitative data. This is also the case regarding migration developments, which are shaped by a variety of factors. In this sense, the SEEMIG Foresight Exercise emphasises qualitative and multi-perspective narratives on possible development paths by focusing on future migration flows until 2025.

### 1.1 Foresight as a method

*Scenarios are "descriptions of journeys to possible futures. They reflect different assumptions about how current trends will unfold, how critical uncertainties will play out and what new factors will come into play". (UNEP 2002: 320)*

Facing the uncertainty and unpredictability of future development paths, the SEEMIG Foresight Exercise aims at applying a qualitative analytical method for offering alternative, not primarily data-based futures. Originally, foresight methods originated in the military context and have been used to better predict future economic, political and social developments since the 1960s. Their core aim is to support decision-making processes by revealing possible changes and alternative future paths. In this sense, by bringing together different perspectives and expertise from persons of different backgrounds, such future-oriented stories can serve as 'mental maps of possible futures, but not as alternative predictions (CEEHPN, 2012:4, cited in TOTH:3)'.

Nonetheless, the methodology can largely vary depending on how analytical steps are designed. While foresight approaches can also be implemented in a creativity-based, expertise-based or evidence-based manner, the approach selected by the SEEMIG consortium corresponds more to a discursive and interaction-based methodology (POPPER 2008). This makes it possible to bring in different angles and may enable the discovery of new patterns by jointly thinking 'outside of the box' in order to realise what opportunities and threats might occur.


#### ***Core aspects of the Austrian SEEMIG Foresight compared to other recent foresight approaches***

Contrary to other SEEMIG countries, a variety of foresight approaches have been undertaken in Austria in the recent past; however, these exercises had different perspectives and thematic angles.

For instance, the thematically most related foresight project was carried out by the *Austrian Integration Fund* (ÖIF 2013). It focused on future integration paths for Austria in three scenarios called ‘social cohesion’, ‘fragmented society’ and ‘populism’. Another scenario project by the Austrian Conference on Spatial Planning was dedicated to examining spatial effects of megatrends by drafting four thematic development scenarios, i.e. by focusing primarily on growth, competitiveness, security or risk. Population development was one of several basic scenarios forming the basis for the aforementioned thematic scenarios (ÖROK 2009). Further scenarios on the spatial development in Europe were elaborated in the framework of an *ESPON 3.2* project, by examining a ‘baseline scenario’, a ‘cohesion-oriented scenario’, a ‘competitiveness-oriented scenario’ and a ‘proactive scenario’. The territorial focus was put on the European Union; specific estimations were then extracted and consolidated in a specific report focusing only on Austria (Dollinger 2007). From a more generalised perspective, migration scenarios were elaborated by the OECD (2009), and further global migration scenarios will soon be issued by the *IMI Oxford Martin School*.<sup>1</sup> Hence, another aim of the Austrian SEEMIG Foresight Exercise was to acknowledge these other foresight projects and to include their findings as a general starting point for discussions.

In comparison to these aforementioned foresight approaches, the SEEMIG foresight methodology mainly emphasises future international migration flows. Instead of thematic development scenarios, the overall approach is structured in a dichotomous manner; contrary starting assumptions form the basis for two extreme scenarios. In the Austrian case, a third path was introduced (see chapter 4). Starting from jointly identified key drivers of migration, further dimensions shaping future migration developments were the focus of the exercise. Thus, possible processes and causal effects were traced – these can be more or less relevant as well as more or less probable and certain developments. Furthermore, so-called ‘wild cards’, such as incidents with only little probability of occurrence but which may greatly impinge on a development path, were introduced. Thus, as uncertainties are an integral part of foresight approaches and possible paths, these might as such not necessarily display probable developments and strong deviations between scenarios may occur. Thus, a variety of development paths may emerge, as also displayed in the ‘scenario funnel’ in Figure 1.

**Figure 1: The foresight approach according to the ‘scenario funnel’**



<sup>1</sup> For further information see <https://www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/imi/>  
source: Reibnitz 1987, cited in ÖIF 2013:20; amended and translated

### ***The Foresight Exercises in the SEEMIG context***

The SEEMIG Foresight Exercise intends to complement further SEEMIG activities that focus more on the quantitative capturing of migration flows, such as historical analyses of migration, examinations of data production systems and the comparison of existing quantitative projections for countries in the SEEMIG area. In general, statistical data may certainly feed into scenarios, but are of secondary importance in this context due to the qualitative nature of the method. However, in Austria, migration statistics and projections served as a stimulus for discussion as well as for roughly estimating future migration flows. With this in mind, the exercise's activities are designed to address critical questions that might significantly shape the future of the South-East European region in the coming years. In order to trace future-oriented perceptions, expectations and fears, discursive workshops were carried out in Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia during winter 2013/14. In some SEEMIG countries, the scenario results will directly contribute to the drafting of evidence-based strategies. Furthermore, the outcomes of all workshops will feed into a comparative analysis as well as into further SEEMIG events, such as the *Stakeholder Focus Group*, the *National Migration Roundtable* and the *Transnational SEEMIG Migration Roundtable*.

#### **1.2 Main findings of the SEEMIG foresight exercise**

The Austrian Foresight Workshop represented a fruitful context for allowing exchange and discourse in an 'unfamiliar' context by bringing together stakeholders with different backgrounds and building on different perspectives. Based on the core assumptions regarding the demographic and economic points of departure that were jointly defined beforehand, two parallel working groups elaborated six different scenario strands: for an 'expansive/positive scenario', the Mobility Scenario' and 'Boom Scenario' were developed, for a 'recessive / negative scenario' a 'Post-colonial Scenario' and 'Doom Scenario' were defined and for a 'endogenous / wild card scenario', a 'Scandinavian/Swiss Scenario' and 'Sinking Island Scenario' were elaborated.

One main finding showed that all scenarios offer room for manoeuvring, as development opportunities may also arise in an economically stagnating context. The positioning of Austria in the global as well as in the EU context was seen as decisive for the future development of the country. Owing to the inherent character of foresight methods, the qualitative SEEMIG scenarios constitute virtual paths that describe possible but not necessarily an obligatory future. Nevertheless, the probability of occurrence of the three scenarios was a point of discussion among the participants. While both the 'expansive/positive scenario' and the 'recessive/negative scenario' were regarded as 'imaginable' for the Austrian development in the upcoming decade, the 'endogenous scenario' was regarded by the participants as very unlikely development. In terms of migration flows, according to the participants, a moderate version of the expansive scenario is the most likely to happen. This also corresponds to demographic projections as carried out by Statistik Austria (+28,809 annual net migration in 2030 according to the 'main variant scenario' of Statistik Austria).

Irrespective of the different probabilities, one core finding of the foresight exercise was that regardless of the overall economic, demographic and labour market situation, some degree of

migration occurs in all scenario strands. While the extent of labour migration flows is shaped by the economic and demographic situation, forms of migration, such as student migration or migration in the context of the search for international migration do not underlie these developments. In terms of geographies of future migration flows, the South-East European area could further constitute an important region of migration origin for Austria, because of the geographical proximity and existing social 'docking sites' in the context of existing social networks. Pro-active measures will also have to aim at activating potentials in new regions of origin beyond Europe.

As regards migration policies, a more systemic and holistic approach was regarded as pertinent, which acknowledges the mutual interrelations with other policy arenas and the fact that more migration and integration mainstreaming is needed. A further important point was the 'body language' of Austria positioning itself as an attractive destination for immigrants with desired job qualifications, but also for retaining its own citizens and resident immigrants in the context of a global struggle for the 'best brains'. At the same time, more investments in diversity management will become indispensable for avoiding social dislocations and to mitigate xenophobic and nationalist attitudes, both as regards public opinion and the media.

### **1.3 Structure of the report**

This report has been developed according to common specifications prepared by the SEEMIG consortium. After the introduction in chapter 1, a brief description of the political and socio-economic context in Austria is given, before trends of international migration in Austria are summarised in chapter 2. Chapter 3 is dedicated to outlining the applied methodology as concerns the workshop and its sessions, anticipated challenges, invited participants and the approach towards analysing the gained material. In chapter 4, the results of the foresight exercise are described. Finally, chapter 5 summarises and draws conclusions on all scenarios, focusing particularly on future challenges and policy needs.

The list of participants, the workshop's agenda as well as further substantiating material are included in the annex.

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This report was elaborated by Heinz Fassmann, Elisabeth Musil and Kathrin Gruber at the University of Vienna. They were also in charge of the overall conceptualisation of the workshop as well as the subsequent analytical steps. Ramon Bauer und Alois Humer contributed to the scenario exercise during the conceptual phase, as co-moderators during the workshop and by providing feed-back

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## 2. COUNTRY CONTEXT

### 2.1 Political and Socio-economic Overview

During recent decades, Austria has experienced prosperous economic development marked by profound socio-economic changes in a changing international context. Clearly, 'politics mattered' for the development of the Austrian economy, a development which was mainly marked by processes of disintegration and integration throughout the 20th century in general, but particularly during the post-war period. Since 1945, Austria has been orientated towards the West, especially towards Germany as the by far most important trade partner (Stiefel 2006:74, Stiefel 2010:97). It was particularly the end of the Cold War in 1989 which made it possible for Austria to move from its peripheral position closer to the centre of a larger Europe.

The development of Austria's economy into an advanced (post-) industrial and service economy during the last few decades is depicted in literature as a 'story of success' (Kausel 2002): while Austria showed the worst records among OECD countries in 1950 following the aftermath of the Second World War, it has since been able to increasingly catch up and is today one of the wealthiest countries in Europe and the world. In terms of GDP per capita, the most frequently used measure of economic development and the standard of living, Austria is among the top countries of the EU 27 countries and as such has one of the wealthiest and most highly developed economies in the world. With the exception of the year 2009, GDP per capita has been increasing in Austria continuously in the last decade.

Being embedded in the European and international context, Austria is affected by current international trends, including a less vigorous trend in international trade and the debt crisis troubling in the Eurozone. Despite the consequences of the financial and economic crisis in 2008/09 and the currently difficult economic situation in Europe, Austria has been able to maintain its position among the economically most successful EU member states for several successive years. In 2012, it was in sixth place behind Luxembourg, Denmark, Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands, but before Germany (ninth place) and above the average of the EU 27 GDP per capita of EUR 23,300, which amounts to 78 per cent of the Austrian value.

**Labour market.** The Austrian labour market exhibits the typical development to an advanced (post-) industrial and service economy. Austria became a service-orientated economy quite early on, particularly in the context of a growing tourist industry in its Alpine regions and Vienna. Since the 1970s, the expanding employment in the tertiary sector of the economy in Austria has offset and even surpassed the decrease of employment in manufacturing, agriculture and mining: in 2012, almost 70 per cent of the workforce was employed in this sector. Despite the difficult economic situation in recent years, Austria has also been performing relatively well its labour market situation. Despite a slight deterioration of conditions, in EU 27 comparison, according to most recent Eurostat figures, Austria records the lowest unemployment rate (4.3%). Furthermore, after Germany and the Netherlands it registers the third lowest youth unemployment rate (9.9%).

**Welfare system.** During the decades after the Second World War, Austria established a welfare state, which provides a comprehensive system of social security and welfare schemes and is characterised by ubiquitous health services, a close-meshed net of hospitals and a high number of hospital beds per inhabitants. The principle of compulsory insurance combined with the co-insurance of children and non-working partners guarantees that essentially the entire population has insurance coverage. The total expenditures on social protection and welfare per capita have increased annually since 2001. In total, the social expenditure amounted to 29.4 per cent of the GDP in 2011, placing Austria sixth in EU comparison behind the Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden and Finland) and France and the Netherlands as ranked by their public expenditures. Compared with main migration partner countries from South-East Europe and other SEEMIG countries, Austria spent the highest share of GDP on social welfare. Austria is as such also characterised by a relatively fair income distribution and equality. The GINI-coefficient in 2011 was 26.3 per cent, which is very low in European and international comparison.

**Population development.** The population development during these years was strongly formed by the socio-demographic changes that were shaped by the underlying political and socio-economic context. Beyond sectorial structural change, higher education of the population is seen as one of the most significant and positive changes of the last sixty years (Fassmann 2006:62). Some of the main consequences of this include decreased fertility, increasingly older age of marriage, fewer marriages and a higher number of divorces. Further recent demographic trends include not only an increase of various forms of cohabitation and solitary living, contributing to smaller household sizes, but also an increase in longevity. In the context of a very low fertility rate below the replacement of 1.43 (2012) level coupled with increased overall longevity, Austria follows the European demographic trend of population ageing, which translates to an increase of the mean age of the population and the increase of the relative weight of elderly people in the population. Population ageing in Austria is a relatively slow, but long-term and irreversible process, which has been noticeable since the beginning of the 20th century.

## 2.2. Development of international migration


While it was an emigration country for decades, Austria gradually developed into a country of immigration in the period after the Second World War. Since the beginning of the 1950s, the size of the population stock has increased from 6.9 million persons in 1952 to 8.4 million in 2013. While part of this growth resulted from birth balance, the major part is ascribed to international migration: in total, the population of Austria increased by approximately 904,000 persons as a result of immigration from 1961 to 2011. As a result, more than one million foreign nationals (1,004,268) were residing in Austria on 1 January 2013, amounting to 12 per cent of the population. Looking at broader indicators, a share of 18 per cent of the population (1,518,234) was of foreign origin, i.e. had a foreign nationality or had been born abroad.

As regards inflows in the recent past, after a decrease in immigration during the second half of the 2000s, immigration flows of the last three years show again an increasing trend. With a net migration of 43,797 persons in 2012, the migration gain was significantly greater than in previous years (+40% compared to 2011). A change in the composition of immigration is also notable; during the past



years, an increased share of immigration resulted from intra-European mobility from the enlarged (Eastern) European Union space. As such, since 2006, annual inflows in the context of inner-EU mobility have exceeded the numbers of immigration from third countries. In 2012, about 62 per cent of all migration gain of foreign nationals was composed of EU nationals (31,518 persons), more than two-thirds (67%) of them were composed of immigrants from EU countries that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. The largest group was comprised of Hungarian nationals (6,609), whose migration gain increased from 2011 to 2012 by about two-thirds, possibly also in the context of ceding transition regulations, which limited the access to the Austrian labour market for some SEEMIG countries until May 2011. At the same time, the net migration of third-country nationals decreased in contrast to earlier decades. The net migration gain of this group was 19,693 persons, 45 per cent among them from other European countries, including the Russian Federation, Serbia and Bosnia & Herzegovina.

**Figure 2: International migration flows and share of foreign nationals on 1 January, 1961-2012**



Source: SEEMIG Country Report Austria 2014, data source: Statistik Austria.

The development into an immigration country occurred involuntarily and largely unnoticed by the public and political sphere. Until the 1990s, immigration of foreign nationals was essentially conceived as temporary movement of 'guest workers'. Immigration policy was an integral part of labour market policy and immigration was controlled by limiting access to the labour market. The focus was put on the protection of Austrian nationals, resulting in a relatively exclusive legal framework and the absence of integration measures for immigrants. This political situation has changed. Since the early 2000s, the control and management of international migration into a

differentiated legal system has become an important issue. Inflows are conceptually differentiated according to the purpose of stay: while legal provisions and measures against irregular migration are highly restrictive, the introduction of a points-based immigration system for (highly) qualified third-country nationals, the *Red-White-Red-Card*<sup>2</sup>, has proven the acceptance and necessity of labour immigration. In addition, specific institutions and committees have been set up and action plans have been formulated in the area of migrant integration. Two diverging migration regimes have been put into place: a managed migration scheme for third-country nationals and a contrasting area of free mobility for nationals of other European Union Member States.

Inclusion in the labour market and in the educational system are said to be pivotal drivers for societal integration. As concerns immigrants and their descendants, disadvantages regarding access to and inclusion in the labour market can still be perceived. The foreign labour force is more often at risk of becoming unemployed and has greater difficulties in (re)integrating into the labour market. This is particularly true for persons with a low level of formal education. However, the shares of persons with foreign backgrounds are significantly higher both at highest and lowest level of education. Data from the *Labour Force Survey 2012* on persons at working age (15 to 64 years) attests to this polarised structuring: 31.9 per cent of foreign nationals and only 20.6 per cent of Austrian nationals had a low level of educational qualification (ISCED 0-2) and 19.3 per cent of foreign nationals and 16.6 per cent of Austrian nationals had completed higher education. The significant concentration of foreign labour in specific sectors that are more exposed to structural changes and seasonal fluctuations also plays a crucial role in the employability of persons with a foreign background.

At the same time, as in other post-industrial countries, Austrian enterprises are increasingly affected by a shortage of skilled labour and are hence taking part in the worldwide competition for highly-qualified migrants, in other words *Brain Drain*. The aforementioned *Red-White-Red Card* is currently the most important instrument in place aiming at attracting third-country nationals to fill labour shortages. Due to ongoing population ageing, lacking geographical mobility and skill mismatch, the competitive situation is expected to increase in the future, varying both at the regional and company level. The crucial questions are how to attract highly qualified immigrants, not only from third-countries but also within the European Union area of freedom of movement, how to retain skilled nationals and how to re-attract skilled expatriates. Austria is said to have difficulties in attracting highly skilled migrants and keeping them – problematic issues in this regard include the recognition of skills obtained abroad, the possibility of moving up the career ladder due to seniority rules and a pronounced insider-outsider segmentation of the labour market.

As mentioned above, the demographic prospects elaborated by *Statistik Austria* assume that if both immigration and birth rates remain at the current level, the population will grow by 11.6 per cent to more than 9.36 million inhabitants by 2050 (*main variant scenario*). Assuming that there is no migration surplus, the population would decrease in the same period by 2.2 per cent to 7.48 million. Hence, immigration is likely to constitute the predominant driving force of future population

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<sup>2</sup> *Red-White-Red Card*: This scheme aims to facilitate the immigration of (highly) qualified third-country workers and their families aiming to permanently settle in Austria, based on personal and labour-market related criteria. Currently, eligible groups of persons for the *Red-White-Red Card* include highly qualified workers, skilled workers in designated shortage occupations, other key workers and self-employed key workers.

development in Austria. Demographic prospects also show that the demand for labour will further increase in the future. Some years ago, the demographic salient point was expected to be reached by 2011, resulting from the retirement of quantitatively stronger cohorts born from 1950 onwards and the simultaneous entering of weaker cohorts born in the mid-1990s. Due to increased immigration during the last years, such gaps could be filled before they came into effect. Hence, the expected turning point is being postponed continuously. According to forecasts of *Statistik Austria*, after a peak value of 4.17 million of people at working age, which should be reached in 2017 (2011: 4.12 million), the trend reversal might occur in 2025 if no further intensification of immigration flows emerges. Thus, as a mature immigration country, Austria has relied on foreign labour to fill shortages for decades and this trend is likely to continue.

### 3. METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Workshop

The SEEMIG Foresight Workshop<sup>3</sup> for Austria '*Future scenarios for Austria: Migration – Demography – Labour Market*' was carried out as a one-day event in Vienna on 13 January 2014. The foresight exercise was widely implemented along the suggested SEEMIG methodology (Toth 2013). However, the approach was tailored due to the specific Austrian context. Embedded as alternative future-oriented approaches in a broader perspective, projects applying different kinds of scenario techniques have been the subject of Austrian discussion rounds for a couple of years (*e.g. integration scenarios, spatial development scenarios...*). Due to this and also to ensure a high participation rate, the decision was taken to carry out the different sessions in the course of one day only, instead of splitting up the exercise into several days (*brainstorming sessions, scenario development*). A test run of this approach was done one week before the workshop, involving scholars at post-doc and pre-doc level as well as students.

Furthermore, the brainstorming session was carried out in one joint and heterogeneous plenary session, where all three sub-groups of participants (*experts, decision makers and civil society*) participated, instead of in three separate and homogenous sessions where these sub-groups would have discussed separately from each other. Two 'mixed' groups then developed three scenarios in parallel, allowing for a comparative perspective. Apart from a process-oriented perspective, a geographical perspective on regions of origin and destination was also introduced as an additional asset to the proposed SEEMIG methodology. Finally, future policy areas were discussed instead of enlightening possible effects at the micro-level. The methodologies of the particular sessions are briefly outlined below.

#### **Session 1: Brainstorming and brain-mapping session – towards key drivers of migration**

In this introductory session, key findings of prior SEEMIG activities in Austria as well as cornerstones of the applied foresight method were presented to the participants in a plenary session in order to stimulate discussions on possible future developments. In a second step, the main drivers for migration to Austria were discussed in an open and interactive manner by focusing on factors that influence immigration. This sequence corresponds to the brainstorming session suggested by the SEEMIG methodology. Participants were asked to indicate drivers that can be deemed as being decisive when examining migration, both in a retrospective and future-oriented perspective. Hence, participants were invited to formulate their thoughts on core factors. As a starting point for discussions, the SEEMIG conceptual model on 'main driving forces of migration'<sup>4</sup> was introduced to wind up the discussions. The session was characterised by a pleasant atmosphere, leaving space for open discussions and free associations. The views and inputs are jointly analysed in *chapter 4.1*.

<sup>3</sup> The agenda of the workshop is included in *Annex 2*.

<sup>4</sup> For further information see SEEMIG Working Paper 1 "Conceptual framework for modelling longer term migratory, labour market and human capital processes", 2013, available from [www.seemig.eu](http://www.seemig.eu).

Lively discussions arose around main reasons that form migration flows and all participants actively contributed to this session.

### **Session 2: Synthesising – selection of main drivers and development of a matrix**

This synthesising session was not carried out as logistically detached from the brainstorming session (as suggested by the SEEMIG methodology) but formed the final phase of Session 1. The moderator summarised the main points of the earlier discussions and outlined them in relation to the proposed model. Once again, the participants were immediately invited to react. No substantial objections were raised; the participants widely agreed that the core aspects were considered, particularly regarding major influences in quantitative terms. Furthermore, the model was substantiated by further aspects determining migration. Hence, a coherent starting point of essential potential shapers of migration futures and underlying assumptions for their development were reached.

### **Session 3: Migration Futures Scenario development: processes and geographies**

Session 3 was carried out in the afternoon session of the Austrian foresight workshop in two parallel working groups composed of six to seven participants each group that belong equally to the pre-defined sub-groups of experts, decision makers and civil society. The groups were dedicated to the development of the actual foresight scenarios on migration developments in Austria for the period up to 2025. The focus was put on developing three scenarios, two of them representing binary scenarios (*one expansive/positive and one recessive/negative scenario*) plus a sort of a 'wild card scenario' (*endogenous scenario*). All of the three scenarios were discussed in the two parallel working groups. Hence, six scenario strands were generated.

After a brief introduction on the approach to the scenario development session, participants in each working group were asked to appoint a 'rapporteur' to present outcomes of this session to the plenary. Discussions started thereafter. As a general guiding question, participants were asked to focus on the following question: "*How will international migration develop in Austria until 2025?*" The pre-defined assumptions were intended to only specify very generally the basis of the respective scenario. As a starting point, participants were asked to discuss and identify the economic, demographic and political 'context' for a scenario. At the very beginning of the scenario development session, in both groups, discussions arose on the term 'expansive' or 'positive' economic growth as well as on the probability of the scenarios (*see also 3.5 and 5*).

After the definition of the socio-economic and political context, 'ensuing processes and drivers' for international migration and labour market developments were discussed. The discussants soon started to go through different dimensions, step by step, until 2025.<sup>5</sup> The moderators supported the group discussions by posing guiding questions and pinning cards on the chart; the facilitators took detailed notes. In a next, slightly shorter phase, the participants were asked to think about how international migration would evolve in a 'recessive' scenario, then in an 'endogenous' scenario. Participants also touched on the topic of possible 'wild cards', which could have disturbing and

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<sup>5</sup> In contrast to the proposed SEEMIG methodology, no break was considered in 2020.

ground-breaking effects on the migratory developments within a scenario (*e.g. implosion of the EU, energy boost, technological developments, EU accession of Turkey, EU accession of Serbia*).

The focus was then shifted to possible geographies of migratory flows in all scenarios. In a matrix, regions of origin and migration types were captured. The main emphasis was put on labour migration, but further types of migration were also considered. In a last step, participants had to label each of their scenarios.

#### **Session 4: Comparison of scenarios and policy responses**

In this fourth session, participants were reunited in the plenary room. The main results of the scenarios were presented by the rapporteurs and commented on by the other participants. In general, participants accepted the pure virtual nature of the developed scenarios and were very satisfied with having applied this out-of-the box-approach.

The SEEMIG methodology suggested developing personal life histories within the scenarios ('heroes', micro-level analysis), but this session was not carried out in the framework of the Austrian foresight workshop. Instead of focusing on the micro level, a session on implications for migration policies was carried out. In a plenary round, future fields of action, core targets and instruments of migration policy were discussed. This final session was again a lively discussion in which the majority of participants engaged.

### **3.2 Participants**

According to the specifications of the SEEMIG methodology, participants of the national foresight exercise were to be composed of an equal number of people (6-8) belonging to three pre-defined sub-groups: 'experts' (*sociologists, economists, statisticians, historians, etc.*), 'decision makers' on the local, regional and national level (*administrative bodies on the local, regional and national level, policy makers, etc.*), and representatives of 'civil society'. In the particular Austrian context, a further main aim was to achieve a multi-faceted and multi-level composition to bring in competent, but also diverging perspectives. Hence, participants were jointly identified and carefully selected by the core UNIVIE team.<sup>6</sup> Hardly anyone declined the invitation, 20 persons confirmed their participation, three persons were prevented from attending due to health or business reasons; in total, 16 persons participated in the event (*see also Annex 1 – List of Participants*). Seven participants can be classified as experts, five as decision makers and four as civil society.<sup>7</sup> Among the sub-group labelled as 'civil society', all persons were representatives of interest groups and some among them had migration background themselves. As regards the overall demographic composition, a slight surplus of male

<sup>6</sup> Potential participants were approached via telephone in November/December 2013. They then received a personalised invitation letter including a 'save the date' message for the workshop. In the week before the event took place, participants received an information package, including a detailed agenda, a short overview on the applied scenario technique and the SEEMIG project, selected main facts about current migration trends in Austria and information on earlier implemented projects and prognoses for Austria (*other scenario projects, examples of evidence-based prognoses*).

<sup>7</sup> The attribution of the participants to one single sub-group is artificial as in many cases participants could be easily ascribed to more than one sub-group. To meet the criteria of the SEEMIG methodology, the attribution was nevertheless carried out and used as broad scheme for the selection of participants as well as the distribution of participants into the afternoon working groups.

participants could be noted (nine males, seven females). Regarding the age structure, an appropriate mixture could be reached. Discussions were lively and fruitful due to great willingness to contribute thematically and due to the profound level of expertise. Participants in all three sub-groups intensively participated throughout the whole workshop.

### 3.3 Approach to analysing material

Apart from audio-recording and note-taking, the main aspects were traced on flip-charts. In order to assure that audio-records and notes could serve as a basis for scientific analyses, the participants were asked to sign a consent form. During the scenario session, major aspects were noted on 'moderation cards' and pinned on pin-boards in a thematically grouped manner. To ensure proper documentation, pictures of the posters were taken after the event. All these techniques aimed at facilitating thorough analyses of the discursive material. As a pivotal basis, minutes in note form were elaborated by the facilitators in German during January 2014. Furthermore, audio-records and pictures of the flip-charts and the pin-boards served to further facilitate the analysis carried out thereafter by the core UNIVIE team. A de-briefing and an internal brainstorming session were held within the UNIVIE team as starting point of the process of analysis. In addition, a feed-back loop was introduced in which participants had the possibility to react to a draft version of the report.

### 3.4 Problems and difficulties

As outlined above, the approach was specifically tailored to embed the SEEMIG scenario exercise into the Austrian context. As such, in order to increase the likelihood of high attendance, the workshop was carried out during one day, instead of dividing the different sessions among several days as suggested by the SEEMIG methodology. This preventive measure turned out to be very effective, as most of the participants were able to stay throughout the entire event.

Adaptations of the contents were carried out, primarily because earlier scenario exercises in Austria had to be taken on board. Hence, the exercise did not start from scratch, but built on the findings of related projects.<sup>8</sup> This implied thorough desk research by the workshop organisers beforehand. In order to directly tap into expert knowledge, experts involved in selected approaches were invited to the SEEMIG foresight exercise whenever possible.

No noticeable problems arose during the implementation of the workshop. During Session 3 (*'Scenario development: processes and geographies'*), the moderators and co-moderators were busy guiding the lively discussions (*as outlined in 3.5*), but due to extensive preparations no remarkable disruptions occurred. To the contrary, all participants showed a great willingness to contribute to the session. One aspect that should be mentioned, also for the interpretation of the different scenarios, is that discussions in the working groups focused to a large extent on the 'expansive / positive' scenario, which was discussed as first scenario. This scenario was thus discussed in more detail than

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<sup>8</sup> These include for example, ÖIF 2013 and ÖROK 2009. For further information see *chapter 1*.

the other two. This was also due to the fact that the participants had to get acquainted with the methodology. For the other two scenarios, they were already familiar with the approach, which meant that less time was necessary for the discussion of the latter two scenarios.

### 3.5 General remarks on the scenarios

When developing the scenarios during the working group discussions, several aspects appeared which are important for the overall interpretation of the scenarios. The main aspects are highlighted hereafter. As briefly mentioned in *chapter 3.1*, at the very beginning of the scenario development session, discussions arose in both groups on the meaning of certain terms employed by the SEEMIG methodology as well as around the overall notion of developments per se. In general, the broad set-up of the exercise caused irritation among some participants (*'What does an expansive/positive, scenario signify?'*, *'Which perspective should be taken – 'positive' in which sense?'*, *'Positive' for whom?'*).

The normative notion of the scenarios also seemed to be disputable (*Does a growing economy necessarily imply a beneficial development path?*). Participants stressed that 'growth' should not be intrinsically regarded as 'positive' and 'recession' connoted as 'negative'. To counter-act this approach, after having first discussed the possibility to apply a more 'conservative approach', Group A decided to use an 'alternative approach' and developed both the 'expansive / positive scenario', as well as the 'recessive / negative' scenario from a more sustainability-oriented point of view. In Group B, as a compromise after a long discussion on the facets of economic prosperity per se, the scenarios were oriented along a more classical understanding of economic growth in terms of an increasing GDP/capita by underlining that in an 'expansive / positive scenario', state action would in parallel aim at 'beneficial action' in a more holistic sense. Group A emphasised that the label 'endogenous' has to be interpreted more as a consequence of an unforeseen development rather than as a basic starting point.

Another aspect relates to the *'probabilities' of the different scenarios*. Some participants stumbled upon the virtual nature of the scenarios (*Should we discuss probable developments or should the probability be neglected?*). Hence, in the very beginning, bundling the discussions and steering them back towards the core aim of developing scenarios, i.e. to elaborate virtual paths and to not necessarily depict probable developments, constituted some challenges for the moderators.

Both groups were marked by constructive and open-minded discussions and all participants actively contributed by introducing their perspectives and perceptions. However, discussions within the working groups were largely affected by the internal group dynamics resulting also from the composition of the groups themselves. In general, Group A was very much shaped by scientific and generalising perspectives with a distinct focus on societal consequences. Group B was more focused on the closer context of migration compared to the current situation, including also a specific focus on the possible structuring of future migration regimes. In the same group, the 'state action' in a potential country of origin also took up a great deal of space. The contributions of participants belonging to 'civil society' were clearly shaped by their perspective or 'professional stake', such as integration, asylum or student migration.



## 4. RESULTS OF THE FORESIGHT EXERCISE

### 4.1 Key drivers of international migration

*“Migration is the crucial factor for population development in Austria”*

*(Workshop participant, anonymised)*

Based on the SEEMIG conceptualisation<sup>9</sup> of key drivers of international migration that was jointly elaborated by the project consortium, UNIVIE proposed a basic model as a starting point for discussions, which was then discussed and further completed by the participants in the plenary session (see Annex 3). The model suggested main aspects for driving forces of international migration, both from the viewpoint of countries of destination as well as countries of origin. In the country of destination, the ‘demand for foreign labour force’ is particularly dependent on a country's demographic development and specific demands arising from a segmented labour market as well as cyclical economic development; however, ‘state action’ is essentially shaped by prevailing public opinions and political strategies. Both of these aspects are seen to be largely inter-twinned. In countries of origin, the same factors, supplemented by conflicts and natural crises, steer the search for labour/protection and as such entail emigration from the country. After a brief presentation of the model, lively discussions arose in the plenary about other reasons causing international migration flows.

In the discussions, participants enhanced the model by bringing in further dimensions of migration and specified the components of the model by applying them to the particular Austrian context. As such, emphasis was also put on the demographic situation and economic cycles as well as the temporal developments in countries of origin. Participants stressed that structural aspects may affect individual possibilities to migrate, such as financial resources, legal circumstances, urban or rural origins etc. Although the suggested model represented a valuable system of ordering factors at the macro-analytical level in the eyes of the participants, they considered that migration could not be solely understood from an economic point of view when looking at securing one's livelihood. Thus, they stressed that the model's factors should be interpreted in a more dynamic manner, having stronger or weaker impact for different types of migration. Social and individual reasons may play crucial roles, such as family reunification plus other network effects, adventure or curiosity. They further stressed that these types of migration are less dependent on economic cycles and labour markets, but are still related to labour migration. For some types of migration, the proposed model has only restricted validity, including:

- transit migration (*where Austria represents only one intermediate stop*),
- refugees and asylum seekers (*the choice of a country of destination cannot be taken self-determined, and where international duties come into the picture; the Roma are a specific case*),

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<sup>9</sup> For further information see SEEMIG Working Paper 1 “Conceptual framework for modelling longer term migratory, labour market and human capital processes”, 2013, available from [www.seemig.eu](http://www.seemig.eu).

- cross-border commuting (*who benefit of the high-wage situation in Austria, but whose purchasing power concerns their country of origin*),
- circular migration and different forms of mobility (*where distance become less relevant, e.g. in the case of long distance commuting*),
- student mobility (*where education is outpacing labour market opportunities*)

Furthermore, participants highlighted that state action should not be solely equated with migration policy, as social policies, both in countries of origin and destination, also directly or indirectly impinge on migratory decisions. Vice versa, the aspect of the 'welfare state' of Austria has itself implications for the rigour of immigration policies of the country, including severe regulations as regards proof of income and social protection upon immigration. As another layer at the international level, thus beyond the nation state's perspective, participants further emphasised that specific attention has to be paid to the EU context when considering driving forces of migration. This is particularly important in the South-East European area, as state action is shaped differently in and towards EU countries and third countries. Third countries in the region have successively transformed into potential and actual EU candidate countries; hence, dynamic aspects have to be considered as conditions for migration may dramatically change – both in countries of origin as well as of destination.

It was further stressed that other influential factors are not covered by the economically-oriented 'push and pull model', such as hegemonic territories, persistent migration paths and regimes of dependency. One participant mentioned therefore that the SEE area could be interpreted as a 'postcolonial space'; thus, current structures can be traced back to common histories and cultural interrelations. This concerns cultural dimensions of ideologies that are ascribed to Austria or attitudes allowing migration (e.g. *racism, chances of advancement, prevailing attitudes, human rights, exploitation of workforce,*

**Figure 2: Dominating pull factors in countries of destination – extended by additional aspects as gathered in the workshop**



Source: UNIVIE

*endeavour to prosperity, mutual courtesy, etc.*). The attractiveness of a country of destination and its 'body language' partially depend on 'public opinion' and, in a further step, on 'political strategy'. In addition, current relations between countries may be decisive ("Which states have each other on their radar?") as well as a country's willingness to adapt specific basic attitudes to migration ("Is Austria seeking seclusion? Is there cultural openness?"). All these aspects influence the expectations of potential migrants. Such factors are also of particular importance when it comes to comprehending integration, not merely migration. The participants hence suggested adding a 'soft bracket' of cultural-ideological or political-historical principles, which influences the 'hard bracket' of the prevailing social system, to the proposed model.

## 4.2 Matrix of key drivers

The conceptual scheme for labour migration was commonly acknowledged by the participants, and further substantiated by cultural-ideological or political-historical brackets plus the influencing power of EU policies and welfare systems. However, when focusing on other types of migration or on mobility, the scheme would have to be adapted, as other factors may become of further or increased importance. Notwithstanding, the given context was not targeted to develop specified models for understanding all types of migration, but rather to have a common starting point for jointly discussing the quantitatively dominating type of migration, i.e. labour migration.

Finally, via a 'tour de table', the decision was consensually taken to particularly focus on the driving forces of international migration relating to demography, economic development and the segmented labour market. In order to have a common starting point for elaborating scenarios, the main assumptions regarding the demographic and economic points of departure were jointly defined beforehand, as visualised in the table below: they were low fertility, high-life expectancy and high economic growth in the 'expansive/positive scenario', low fertility, high life expectancy and stagnating economic growth in the 'recessive / negative scenario' and high fertility, high-life expectancy and high economic growth in the 'endogenous / wild card scenario'. The other dimensions, including public opinion and political strategy should then be dedicated to structuring the discussions of the subsequent working groups.

**Table 1: Overview on scenarios including matrix of basic drivers**

<i>Drivers</i>	<b>1</b> Expansive / Positive Scenario	<b>2</b> Recessive / Negative Scenario	<b>3</b> Endogenous / Wild Card Scenario
<b>Demography</b>	~ Low fertility, high life expectancy	~ Low fertility, high life expectancy	+ High fertility, high life expectancy
<b>Economic Cycle(s)</b>	+ High economic growth	~ Stagnating economic Growth	+ High economic growth
<b>(Segmented) Labour Market</b>	<i>for discussion</i>	<i>for discussion</i>	<i>for discussion</i>
<b>Public Opinion / Society</b>	<i>for discussion</i>	<i>for discussion</i>	<i>for discussion</i>
<b>Political Strategy</b>	<i>for discussion</i>	<i>for discussion</i>	<i>for discussion</i>


Source: UNIVIE, SEEMIG Foresight Workshop.

### 4.3 Migration Future Scenarios

*How could international migration in Austria evolve until 2025?*

As described above, based on core assumptions as defined in the plenary (see *Figure 3*), three scenarios types were discussed in a parallel session of two mixed groups (*Group A and B*) in order to examine the question of how migration in Austria could evolve until 2025. In this sense, two respective paths per scenario were traced separately. As outlined before, the developed scenarios constitute virtual paths; as such, they do not necessarily depict probable developments. Instead, they should be understood as stories that were created as consistently and coherently as possible, were constructed in a discursive manner, and depend on the perspectives of the actors contributing to the discussions.

**Figure 3: Scenario matrix**



Source: own illustration UNIVIE.

The deviations of the outcomes and cornerstones of the scenarios highlight the discursive, multi-faceted and unpredictable notion of qualitative foresight exercises. In total, the exercise resulted in six scenario strands: They were called '*Mobility Scenario*', '*Post-colonial Scenario*' and '*Scandinavian/Swiss Scenario*' by group A. Group B labelled them '*Boom Scenario*', '*Doom Scenario*' and '*Sinking Island Scenario*'.

In the following subchapters, a time leap into Austria to the year 2025 will be undertaken – and the migration situation and context at this point in time will be illustrated as developed by the different scenarios. A comparative reflection on prospective dynamics of migration flows per scenario will then be proposed and substantiated by a contrasting table. Chapter 5 makes a synopsis of all three scenario types.



### 4.3.1 Migration Future Scenario 1 – Expansive/Positive Scenario

In the case of the expansive or positive scenario, the two working groups set out from the same, broadly defined starting points relating to the economic and demographic context: a situation characterised by high economic growth, low fertility and high life expectancy. The scenario strand developed by Group A was labelled as *'Mobility Scenario'*, the scenario developed by Group B as *'Boom Scenario'*. Both

Drivers	1 Expansive / Positive Scenario
Demography	~ Low fertility, high life expectancy
Economic Cycle(s)	+ High economic growth

Label  
1a/Group A *'Mobility Scenario'*  
1b/Group B *'Boom Scenario'*

groups pursued different paths of storytelling and focused on different emphases. Nonetheless, the core outcomes are comparable: participants in both groups assumed that immigration will rise in Austria, the EU area will remain of particular importance as a region of origin, but a further diversification of migration flows might be expected. After outlining the major findings of each group discussion, similarities between both scenario strands will be traced in more detail hereafter.

#### 1a: Mobility Scenario

**Economy and demography.** In the so-called *'Mobility Scenario'* developed by Group A, Austria is well integrated into an economically growing Europe, which itself is well positioned within the wider global context. The Austrian economy is characterised by high economic growth rates and great innovative strength, particularly in the high-tech sector. In general, however, prosperity is not understood as mere economic growth marked by an increase of GDP/capita, but as qualitative, sustainable growth. The EU area is characterised by a harmonised policy-framework relating to taxes, environmental regulations and occupational health and safety. As a further answer to regional competition, harmonised rules have been created for enterprises throughout the EU. In parallel, retained national competencies counterbalance uneven conditions between countries, so that displacement of enterprises in favour of low-wage countries is prevented. At the same time, in Austria, a convergence-oriented approach aims at reducing regional disparities. A more distinct common external representation contributes to the EU recognition as a 'global player', while reducing its seclusion towards third countries and 'great powers'. Adjustment processes are noticeable between EU countries, and South-East European countries are increasingly catching up, depending on their relation to the EU. The EU invests more in supporting the convergence with North Africa, although developments and conditions still remain comparatively distant.

**Labour market developments.** The Austrian labour market is characterised by a high participation rate and low unemployment. While some sectors such as manufacturing industries are marked by economic decline and are confronted with increased unemployment, the demand for labour in general is increasing, despite the fact that international connectedness and division of labour are shifting additional jobs to other countries and that innovation brings resource-efficient approaches that reduce labour demand. The labour demand is growing particularly strongly in selected sectors, with more pronounced labour growth effects in knowledge-intensive segments than in labour-intensive segments. As such, the educational sector is a growing sector. Increased labour demand arises also because of prevailing demographic trends: e.g. in the IT sector because of a shrinking size

of the working-age population and in the healthcare sector because of population ageing. Labour demand is also growing in the trade and technical sectors following economically-induced increased demand. From the viewpoint of the 'cosmopolite' society, the labour market is not considered anymore from a national perspective. In general, cooperation is further deepened within the EU, as member states act in a less nation-state oriented manner. The Austrian labour market is considered as an autonomous, but interlaced economic area, with its specific attributes.

**Society and policies.** Austrian society is marked by a high degree of mobility, both as regards spatial as well as social mobility. Public policies are aimed at guaranteeing social equity and cohesion. Social welfare benefits are guaranteed, as low fertility and high life expectancy are mitigated by high economic activity rates and low unemployment. Substantial progress has been achieved regarding labour market conditions and fairer wage levels, especially legitimate minimum wages. The provision of an unconditional basic income contains precarious employment. Education and research are appreciated as agents of productivity since they trigger innovation. A well-functioning educational system that is evolving towards a system 'encouraging the maximum' facilitates the unfolding of individual talents and assures good employment possibilities for the majority of the population. More emphasis is put on intergenerational knowledge transfer, on *Life Long Learning* and on flexible educational and training offers. Specific educational offers are made to specific target groups, including unemployed and low skilled persons and immigrants. As the median age is increasing due to population ageing, specific forms of employment are being promoted, such as the extension of part-time employment models for elderly persons. New interpretations of 'age' and 'work' regard persons aged 60 and above as active contributors to society. Such approaches do not discount the prospects of young people but complement their contributions. An employment model of reduced and flexible working hours and possibilities for temporary career interruptions for family and educational reasons assures individual professional development.

**International migration.** International migration forms an inherent component of this scenario; increasing connections across borders lead to more international migration as well as to enhanced mobility and commuting. While the highly regulated 'medium skilled' segments, apart from some exceptions, do not show an increase of foreign labour demand, a demand for foreign labour force arises especially in the 'high skilled' and 'low skilled' sectors, as well as skilled workers in the areas of, for example, chimney sweeps and roofers; the 'permeability' of borders of Austria, and in this context also the European Union, as well as the access to the labour market for third-country nationals is decisive in this regard. In general, greater openness towards migration is growing and populist views are successively being reduced. Austria is repositioning itself to enhance its attractiveness, as there is a fierce competition for skilled and highly-skilled migrants. As such, European and national immigration regulations for third-country nationals as well as the recognition of qualifications gained abroad are being eased so as to avoid effects that might lower migrants' opportunities. On the other hand, Austria has to cope with a certain amount of 'non-manageable' migration flows, particularly affecting the low-skilled segment, especially from within the EU, as well as irregular immigration from third countries. Furthermore, support measures are being increased for business start-ups of migrants in order to further foster self-employment activities. The

transferability of social security entitlements and pension rights for migrants further increase the 'permeability' of borders and the circularity of mobility.

### 1b: Boom Scenario

**Economy and demography.** In the '*Boom Scenario*', the Austrian economy is growing with an annual growth of above +2% of the GDP; as such, Austria surpasses the economic performance of Europe as a whole. Pre-existing economic relationships have been further deepened. In parallel, the ongoing processes of population ageing continue to shape demographic developments throughout Europe. These factors directly impinge on developments in the labour markets; as more and more people enter the retirement age, the demand for labour force increases. While qualification measures that enhance the employability of the youth, women and the elderly contribute to partly mitigating these labour shortages through the activation of domestic labour force reserves, the recourse to immigration as a response to labour market needs is necessary.

**Labour market developments.** As a result of Austria's continuous economic growth throughout the entire upcoming decade, shortages of skilled labour occur across practically all segments of the labour market. In parallel, illegal employment of immigrants also increases. The growing demand for highly-skilled labour force is partially covered through domestic potentials by advancing educational climbers or by activating 'hidden reserves' via the promotion of women and families. Nevertheless, continuous economic growth is not likely to occur without migration in a longer perspective, as growing demand for labour force commonly goes hand in hand with the absorption of additional foreign labour force. Austria is still concerned about the 'competition for the best brains' and faces a constant loss of domestic highly-skilled labour force and still has difficulties in embedding foreign graduates from Austrian universities into the labour market. "*Austria is providing skills, but is hardly able to retain fully skilled persons (workshop participant, anonymised)*". In this sense, steady immigration of highly-skilled persons plays an essential role. Thus, labour market needs are anticipated at the policy level in order to harness the potentials of immigration. The expansion of the labour immigration instrument *Red-White-Red Card* and enhanced recognition of qualifications gained abroad are policy reactions in this regard.

Bottlenecks in labour market segments do not simply demand highly-skilled labour force; in fact, it was stressed that the lack of medium skilled labour force is partially 'home-made'. Some segments are particularly affected and can hardly be restocked with domestic labour force, because the number of Austrian apprentices is steadily decreasing. The sectors of healthcare and domestic services are particularly affected. Since responding to these labour shortages by fostering new immigration is considered to be too narrow, the better integration of already present immigrants into the labour market is enhanced. In this regard, steps towards more diversity management are being undertaken, both by public bodies as well as at the enterprise level.

**Society and policies.** Economic development and state action are strongly interdependent. At the beginning of the new millennium, Austria was said to be an attractive immigration country, which could not be confirmed if compared to other countries that apply less rigid immigration policies. As a consequence, state action is increasingly pro-active, aiming at facilitating immigration and at raising wage levels, particularly for highly-skilled and skilled workers (e.g. care). As opposed to earlier



trends, tangible progress in a universally accepted 'welcome culture' is noted and ameliorations regarding islamophobic attitudes can be perceived. In general, the welfare system is more open towards economically disadvantaged persons, regardless of their citizenship or migration background. This can be confirmed by a retrospective view – in economically stable times, civil society and policy makers have been more open to receiving migrants. This is largely due to the lack of striking counter-arguments such as financial constraints.

**International migration.** As lined out above, further increasing international migration particularly correlates with labour market needs. Immigration is generally oriented along economic prosperity in total; however, this is less oriented toward the gradient of growth, and more toward the relative economic growth compared to other European countries. In general, the economically favourable situation in the European Union acts as a pull factor for potential migrants in third countries. In contrast, prosperous economic circumstances in the country of origin, be it a European Union or a South-East European country, prevent potential migrants from leaving and reduce Austria's attractiveness. Simultaneously, a growing economy does not necessarily imply that every immigrant can actually be employed, even if the growth rate is enormous.

Labour migration forms only one part of the total immigration. Some types of migration flows are less connected to economic cycles. Furthermore, not only 'desired' types of migration occur. Some forms of migration remain at the same level, such as educational migration or family reunification. Others show increasing tendencies, i.e. inflows of persons in search of international protection. In addition, the demographic situation in countries of origin will have strong influences on the overall migration situation. However, third countries of further distance gain weight. The North African region ranks among more important regions of origin due to geographical proximity, although the historical, cultural and social proximity is at a moderate level compared to 'traditional' countries of origin. Hence, a further diversification of countries of origin and subsequently of Austrian society should be expected. Moreover, Austria faces a growing number of persons on the move for whom the country only constitutes an interim stop. In parallel, re-migration continues or even increases. In order to avoid critical developments, positive state action aims at enhancing Austria's attractiveness as a permanent place of residence by offering eased access to residence permits. This particularly aims at attracting third-country nationals. As formerly important countries of origin within the European Union are themselves experiencing economic prosperity (*e.g. Germany*), Austria can draw less from immigration from the latter. In general, the diversity of intra-EU mobility is still less perceivable in statistical terms than that of third country nationals (*e.g. freedom of movement, no obligation to prove language proficiency*). However, even if the economic growth of another EU country is beyond the Austrian level, well established migration regimes still lead to a migration surplus from these countries. Nonetheless, the general economic prosperity in a traditional country of origin has obvious mitigating effects on the general preparedness to emigrate towards Austria.

### Scenario 1: International migration in Austria 2025 – synoptic reflections

In both stories, immigration forms an integral part of the scenarios and the necessity of exchange and circulation between countries was highlighted. The size of inflows remains at current levels or

even exceeds them in the context of eased immigration regulations for third-country nationals. According to group A, the annual net migration amounts to between 30,000 and 50,000 persons; Group B assumed a value between 30,000 to 80,000 persons per year (*cf. 2012: 43,797 according to Statistik Austria*). Furthermore, a further diversification of migration is expected, both in terms of types of migration as well as countries of origin. In terms of types of immigration, labour migration significantly increases and educational mobility continues to grow, especially from Germany and South-East Europe. However, irregular immigration also increases in both cases. As regards the geography of migration, the European Union remains the main region of origin; inflows from this area comprise labour migration, including both highly skilled and low skilled workers. As a secondary source, immigration from third countries also increases and diversifies. Beyond traditional countries of origin, new regions of origin emerge. Educational migration, especially from Germany as well as South-East Europe continues to grow. Immigration from Eastern and South-East European countries continues to surpass Southern European countries, even though these are still affected by longer-term effects of the economic and financial crisis of 2008/09. Demographic circumstances in regions of origin play a greater role in migration decisions than before, specifically in Africa and Asia, as well as in successor states of the former Soviet Union, especially in Ukraine and the Caucasus. Some patterns of third-country nationals are specifically shaped along certain labour market segments; for example, India will become an important source country for highly innovative jobs. Both groups emphasised that 'non-steerable' migration flows endure.

Within Austria, international migration continues to be concentrated in urban areas and their surroundings as well as in particular areas that are predominantly touristic or that accommodate specialised enterprises. In particular, the East-West axis in Austria (*Vienna – Linz - Salzburg*) shows further growth. Nevertheless, there are some spill-over effects into rural areas. For some labour market segments such as the building sector or care services, migration appears across all spatial types.

Even if immigration remains a prevailing migration phenomenon in Austria, emigration also continues according to an Austrian long-term trend. This trend is accompanied by specific challenges, as Austria risks losing talented labour force. Whether Austria is able to maintain a skilled and highly skilled workforce substantially depends on the level of attractiveness that is reached by 2025. If the current living conditions for third-country nationals cannot be ameliorated accordingly, Austria will degrade to a mere transit country for human capital, including flows from the South-East European area.

A range of 'wild cards' that were introduced into the scenarios stories had a markedly distortive effect. While the likely accession to the EU of Yugoslavian successor states like Serbia by 2025 are deemed to have less important inclinations, the less likely accession of Turkey is expected to have pronounced effects on migration flows to EU countries, including Austria. As another 'wild card', the disintegration of the EU is expected to deeply modify migratory interrelations, even though Austria would hardly be likely to become totally isolated due to adapted economic agreements.

#### **4.3.2 Migration Future Scenario 2 – Recessive/Negative Scenario**

The development of the recessive/negative scenario strands started from the assumptions of a situation of stagnating economic growth, low fertility and high life expectancy. The names chosen for the developed scenario strands were '*Post-colonial Scenario*' and '*Doom Scenario*'. The working groups found that unfavourable economic developments and accompanying conditions would decrease Austria's

attractiveness as an immigration country, thereby aggravating regional disparities. Nonetheless, a recessive scenario does not necessarily have to be perceived as negative; through a re-evaluation of the situation, other development paths may become imaginable, at least according to outcomes of scenario 2a.

Drivers	2 Recessive / Negative Scenario
Demography	~ Low fertility, high life expectancy
Economic Cycle(s)	~ Stagnating economic growth
Label	2a/Group A ' <i>Post-colonial Scenario</i> ' 2b/ Group B ' <i>Doom Scenario</i> '

## 2a: Post-colonial Scenario

**Economy and demography.** In the '*Post-colonial Scenario*' strand, Austria is experiencing stagnating economic development, and the earlier demographic developments characterised by low fertility and a high life expectancy prevail. Strategies to overcome the stagnating economic development by 2025 do not exist. The entire EU area is affected by a recessive development and is developing into a 'Europe of competitiveness' with increasing regional disparities. Regional disparities are also increasing within Austria. The state budget deficit necessitates cuts to all public expenses, leading to cut-backs of investments in research and education, culture and infrastructure. Austria constitutes a fairly unattractive location for businesses and certain business sectors collapse. Only the tourism sector is expanding; a flourishing 'disneyfication' of the country is emerging, while the importance of other types of tourism is declining. Wage levels decrease, the gap between the rich and the poor widens and social deteriorations occur.

**Labour market developments.** Following the collapse of business branches and the generally difficult economic development, the demand for labour stagnates; the low demand of labour is contrasted by a low amount of supply. However, branch-dependent differences prevail: as such, the aforementioned 'disneyfication' in the Austrian tourism sector creates a particular demand for a low-skilled workforce and, at the very least, has seasonal effects on the labour market. In this context, the economic activity rates of 2014 remain fairly stable until 2025; however, the phenomenon of hidden unemployment rises, which is reflected in declining employment rates of selected groups. Women and young people are among those who are most affected. Nevertheless, 'traditional, male dominated jobs' are also affected by the recession. Furthermore, although the labour supply generally decreases in the context of the low birth rate, economic activation of the elderly is not undertaken. Education cuts particularly concern less educated groups and increasingly less skilled personnel is available. A distinct 'strive for education' evolves as better education is understood as a key to better jobs. Nonetheless, 'brain drain'-effects of (highly) skilled leaving the country accelerate due to the limited availability of jobs for highly-skilled persons.

On the other hand, a recession could also become a chance to shift the general focus to greater sustainability, counteracting currently dominating mind-sets that rely on 'growth only'. In this regard,

a subsistence economy is revived and more and more people become self-sufficient. Thus, creation of value is induced in spite of a lack of capital. There are no investments in research and the conditions for businesses start-ups are difficult. However, because of this context, specific niches (e.g. smaller economies and businesses) evolve. Some niches are especially influenced and formed by entrepreneurs with a migration background, as they show greater flexibility and adaptability due to the precarious conditions they faced in their countries of origin. Thus, niches in innovative areas contribute to (cyclical) economic growth. Competitiveness is thereby (partially) strengthened through the discovery of alternative paths, despite the fact that the overall economy of the country is 'dozing'.

**Society and policies.** Austria has degenerated into a 'sleeping country', with people residing in Austria but working in neighbouring countries. Due to the economic circumstances, the national public debt rises. Reduced fiscal revenues provoke further cutbacks of social benefits and services for citizens; as a reaction to this lack of social services, families revert to the elderly population to provide childcare and other supportive tasks. Differences within the population increase. There are fewer education initiatives and the quality of public education declines; those who can afford to do so send their children to private schools. The gap between the poor and the rich widens (*'There will be wealth, but less evenly distributed.'*), and de-motivation and social tensions increase. Scapegoats are framed and social frictions and xenophobia accelerate. The process of European integration is hampered by right-wing populism, and negative attitudes towards immigrants prevail.

**International migration.** Austria's position as an immigration country becomes less important and is only attractive for migrants facing even worse labour market and social conditions in their country of origin. Already persistent migration paths nevertheless remain due to the historically evolved image of the country (*'Austria is doing fine anyway.'*). In a same vein, the principle of freedom of movement within the European Union is questioned, as nation states separate from one another.

## 2b: Doom Scenario

**Economy and demography.** In the *'Doom Scenario'*, Austria, like Europe in general, shows a stagnating economic development, a low fertility level and a high life expectancy. The country is facing increasing unemployment rates; many persons of foreign origin are unemployed. Enhanced shielding in economic and societal terms arises and free movement decreases. The country evolves towards a 'fortress Austria'.

**Labour market developments.** Despite persisting recessive tendencies, some demand for labour force persists. The 'baby-boom generation' increasingly retires, but instead of making recourse to foreign workforce, domestic potentials are activated via qualification measures. Hence, additional foreign workforce is less needed in highly-skilled and skilled segments, but demand still exists in specific skilled segments that are growing due to population ageing, such as care services.

Immigrants are also needed in low-skilled segments that are less dependent on economic cycles, such as cleaning and the construction sector. Many of them are engaged in informal employment agreements and are more affected by wage dumping. The segmentation of the labour market is intensified.

**Society and policies.** Austria is traversed by xenophobic attitudes; this concerns both public opinion and political strategy, which are interrelated and fuel each other. Migration regulations are tightened so as to avoid attracting 'undesired' migration that cannot be integrated into the labour market. Hence, it is increasingly difficult for migrants to obtain a valid residence permit. In parallel, conditions for participating in the welfare system are tightened, including health insurance. As a consequence, foreigners in particular experience exclusion from social benefits, and persons of foreign background who are already residing in Austria are also increasingly concerned.

**International migration.** While the total number of inflows declines due to limited demand for foreign labour force, emigration and remigration increase. Irregular migration as a 'non-steerable' type of migration persists as long as it is worth the effort to overcome the barriers for the individual. Austria is less attractive for highly-skilled third-country nationals who could substantially contribute to overcoming the recession. At the same time, more highly-skilled Austrians will migrate to countries offering better living conditions and wage levels. The same occurs for highly-skilled non-nationals who perceive Austria only as an interim stop. Hence, the negative spiral development accelerates further.

### Scenario 2: International migration in Austria 2025 – synoptic reflections

Both recessive / negative scenario strands assume a distinct decrease of Austria's attractiveness as a country of destination. This particularly concerns immigration for reasons of employment. Immigration from neighbouring countries and other 'traditional' countries of origin are of particular significance; hence, migration trajectories follow beaten tracks, leading to bigger centres of 'post-colonial' spaces, e.g. Vienna and Budapest. Nonetheless, a certain demand for foreign labour remains – this concerns the specifically skilled labour force and the low-skilled labour force. Particularly when third-country nationals face comparatively worse economic and demographic conditions in their country of origin, they are willing to migrate to Austria and accept unfavourable conditions, such as low wages, seasonal employment and reduced social security. Some migration flows, including asylum seekers, show persisting tendencies, as they do not directly depend on economic cycles. The level of informality rises, rendering migration and employment less replicable. Irregular migration increases to a large extent. Simultaneously, Austria faces distinct problems in attracting highly-skilled foreigners and retaining highly-skilled Austrians. More and more people on the move perceive Austria solely as an interim stop. Hence, emigration and transit migration become major challenges.

Within Austria, immigration is largely concentrated in urban regions and their surroundings as well as in touristic regions. Thus, increasing concentration tendencies appear. Furthermore, internal migration gains weight due to the scarcity of jobs. This contributes to a further population decrease in peripheral regions and to a further decline of job opportunities, accompanied by increasing vacancy rates of housing property.

Albeit decreasing labour migration, the out-migration does not exceed in-migration. For instance, group B estimated that a net migration rate between the zero-level and 20,000 is reached in 2025. Nonetheless, as in scenario 1, a jumbling up of developments is imaginable, be it through a distorting

incident or through advancing alternative paths by more pro-active state action. Once again, the global and EU-related positioning plays a crucial role in this regard.

#### 4.3.3 Migration Future Scenario 3 – Endogenous/ Wild Card Scenario

The final future scenario related to an emerging situation of high economic growth, high fertility and high life expectancy. The two strands developed were called the ‘*Scandinavian/Swiss Scenario*’ and the ‘*Sinking Island Scenario*’. In both of these strands, Austria is surrounded by economically stagnating countries and is thus not the only growing economic and demographic pole for migration. Even if endogenous scenarios have a distinctly improbable connotation and are dependent on ‘wild card’ assumptions, hypothetical simulations make it possible to draw interesting conclusions on changing migration regimes and societal consequences.

Drivers		3 Endogenous / Wild Card Scenario
Demography	+	High fertility, high life expectancy
Economic Cycle(s)	+	High economic growth
Label	3a/Group A ‘ <i>Scandinavian/Swiss Scenario</i> ’ 3b/Group B ‘ <i>Sinking Island Scenario</i> ’	

##### 3a: Scandinavian/Swiss Scenario

**Economy and demography.** In the ‘*Scandinavian / Swiss Scenario*’, the Austria of 2025 shows features of Switzerland or Scandinavian countries of 2014. ‘Wild cards’, such as the achievement of total energy autarky or an imploding European Union, are leading to such an ‘endogenic’ encapsulation of Austria. The EU’s sphere of influence is very limited, while the economic developments at the national level are of central importance. Even though the Austrian economy is less outwardly oriented, specific international interrelations continue, as a complete partition would be unrealistic or ‘fatal’. As such, impulses for innovation and mobility from abroad are essential. Enhanced inward-oriented tendencies either lead to ‘communist-effects’ with a more isolated connotation, or to strengthened social systems with internationally oriented economic ties, such as in Scandinavian countries. Switzerland serves as another example for an endogenously-oriented country. In economic terms, the country is set up as more inwardly oriented and is marked by reactive approaches; however, at the same time, it is internationally oriented and open in some spheres.

**Labour market developments.** Following the increasing fertility rate, the demand for labour is primarily covered by the domestic workforce. Increasing fertility rates are the consequence of complete changes in the gender regime. Two manifestations are imaginable in this regard: either an ‘actual collaborative division of family duties’ can be observed, following Scandinavian practices, which offer greater possibilities of childcare for women and a greater ‘permeability’ for men; or the prevailing attitude is that ‘a woman’s place is in the home’. Ensuing from current attitudes (2014), the latter development was seen as a realistic development in Austria. Less migration occurs in both directions.

**Society and policies.** As external structures disappear, there is a search for new priorities; a radical and fundamental change in social values has evolved in central areas of the population, including a

movement towards slow food, 'small is beautiful' and environment-sensitive approaches. While economic exchange is taking place, focus is put on local resources following the slogan '*We, only from within us*'. As a consequence of the aforementioned processes, pro-labour migration measures cannot be reasoned in a plausible manner by national policy makers. If migration is favoured, then it is done for other reasons, including cultural ties or initiatives aiming at exchange. If a 'more Swiss' path is pursued, a preventive and islamosceptical public opinion could also arise, comparable to that of Switzerland in 2014.

### 3b: Sinking Island Scenario

**Economy and demography.** In the '*Sinking Island Scenario*', the dissolution of the European Union constitutes the pivotal 'wild card'. The whole European Union experiences a recessive economic development, while Austria is economically prospering. As the EU is marked by growing disintegration, increasing bunker mentalities of nation states lead to the encapsulation of Austria.

**Labour market developments.** Despite Austria's general economic and political partitioning, co-operation with Germany and South-East European countries still remain, though in a different form. Due to a positive natural population growth, Austria is able to rely on the domestic workforce to fill labour shortages. There is a growing tendency towards traditional handcraft ('*The shielding will lead to an increasing maledivisation*').

**Society and policies.** The scenario features circumstances that prevailed during the 1970s and 1980s. Among others, the oil crisis and the crisis in Poland were forming factors. Until Austria's EU accession, migration was marked by annual variations, but generally remained at a low level. Former migration had been characterised by flows of guest-workers, who predominantly migrated alone without their families. Hence, flows were thereafter shaped by family reunification on the one hand and by re-migration to their country of origin on the other hand. Analogously in this scenario, in spite of shielding effects and closed borders, uncontrolled migration flows continue. All other countries become third countries and migration in total is thus subject to aggravated immigration regulations. Migration regimes are very much subordinate to emerging crises. Family reunion as a type of migration takes on particular importance.

### Scenario 3: International migration in Austria 2025 – synoptic reflections

Labour immigration dramatically decreases. Nonetheless, some types of migration endure, particularly in the case of 'non-manageable' migration flows, relating to international protection and family reunification. Beyond employment reasons, further motives play a role for immigration to Austria, such as cultural ties and international exchange. Within Austria, immigration largely is concentrated in urban regions and their surroundings. Spill-over effects rarely occur and spatial concentration prevails. Only in the case of de-industrialisation (as another 'wild card') do specific areas become attractive, even for non-nationals, and thus experience effects counteracting rural exodus. According to the estimations of Group B, the net migration rate approaches zero in this regard. Emigration from Austria continues.

## 5. SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSIONS

Owing to the inherent character of foresight methods, the qualitative SEEMIG scenarios constitute logically consistent illustrations of possible migration futures that were developed based on specific assumptions, trends and key factors. In contrast to prognoses, they describe a possible but not necessarily obligatory future. Nevertheless, the probability of whether one of the three scenarios will actually occur was a point of discussion among the participants. While both the 'expansive/positive scenario' and the 'recessive/negative scenario' were regarded as 'imaginable' for the Austrian developments in the upcoming decade, the 'endogenous scenario' was regarded by the participants as a very unlikely development.<sup>10</sup> In terms of migration flows, according to the participants, a moderate version of the expansive scenario is the most probable scenario to actually happen. This corresponds with demographic projections carried out by Statistik Austria (*+28,809 annual net migration in 2030 according to the 'main variant scenario' of Statistik Austria*). This being said, the most probable and most preferable development for migration in Austria in the next ten years is likely to be situated in between the developed foresight scenarios, and will thus be characterised by a mixture of the displayed aspects. For this purpose, it seems relevant to examine transversal aspects related to all three scenarios. In fact, a number of cross-cutting themes and issues arose in the expert discussions across all three scenarios. They are discussed in this chapter, by specifically focusing on aspects related to migration and the labour market. The identified features and complementary policy implications are summarised in the table below.

### Potential of each future situation

Across all scenario discussions, the interpretation and meaning of basic economic and demographic 'framing conditions' for migration seemed disputable for the participants, because economic prosperity should not necessarily solely be understood as growth in quantitative terms. For instance, a greater focus on beneficial growth in 'qualitative' terms might lead to alternative future paths, emphasising sustainable development, cultural openness and the better use of resources instead of competitiveness. In a similar vein, while at first the labels of the three elaborated scenarios suggest distinct dichotomous connotations in the sense of 'black and white thinking', each one of them can be seen from a different angle and thereby exhibit both opportunities and threats for Austrian society as a whole.

### Importance of international and European context and relations

The positioning of Austria in the global and in the EU context was seen as decisive for the future development of the country. While economic prosperity and increasing international interrelations

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<sup>10</sup> For this reason, the endogenous scenario itself was regarded and later labelled as a 'Wild Card Scenario' in the overall Austrian methodology. As such, participants developing the '*Sinking Island Scenario*' stressed that assumptions made in the context of the scenario strand were very improbable developments, as such dramatic demographic changeovers could not have direct effects on the Austrian labour market within the short period until 2025. Only 'undisclosed reserves' could rise and the economic participation rate of women would decrease due to increasing childcare duties. The group that developed the '*Scandinavian / Swiss Scenario*' also assumed that it was very unlikely that Austria would follow such an encapsulated development path, also due to the country's size.



as well as steps towards greater transnational harmonisation and European Union integration are core assumptions of the 'expansive scenarios', the 'recessive scenarios' are characterised by increased international competition and regional disparities. As for the 'endogenous scenarios', greater economic and political shielding are expected to evolve; however, in this case as well, international interrelations persist, albeit to a lower degree. Thus, even though there are great variances in the extent of international relations throughout the different scenarios, international relations as concerns the movement of goods and persons persist in each scenario. How exactly they are shaped will have important effects on the migration regime of the country. For the intra-EU context at the regional level, a crucial factor is whether general political preference is given to convergence or competitiveness. These general alignments will define common steps towards enhanced harmonisation of regulations and conditions for mutual interrelations. As regards migration developments, the future embedding of Austria in the European Union will determine aspects of mobility and free movement, the access of third-country nationals to the labour market, and finally, Austria's and the European Union's positioning towards third countries.

### **Migration as an integral part of future development**

Despite the different assumptions and developments regarding economic development and the demographic context, international migration was seen as an integral part of each scenario. Both the 'expansive' and the 'recessive' scenarios are characterised by population ageing due to low fertility rates and increasing life expectancy. As a phlegmatic parameter, demography is characterised by great temporal stability. Thus, even in the 'endogenous' scenarios, where a positive natural population development was assumed, the dramatic demographic changeovers would have no direct effects on the Austrian labour market during the analysed reference period, as the additional workforce would only become economically active from 2030 onwards. Furthermore, despite qualification measures for activating domestic workforce potentials, in all three scenarios a certain amount of additional foreign workforce is needed to satisfy domestic labour market demands. This applies at the very least to specific labour market segments, as will be discussed below. The future extent of daily cross-border commuting and periodically transnational mobility is likely to depend on the relative economic and demographic positioning of regions of origin compared to potential regions of destination, plus individual willingness to undertake long- or longer-distance commuting. In general, these types of movement clearly belong to flexible labour markets and will thus barely be steerable, as they are often of an informal nature. Furthermore, they are hardly tangible in quantitative terms and pose specific problems vis-à-vis financial redistribution and social policies.

Apart from labour migration, some further types of immigration are expected to pertain to all three types of scenarios, regardless of Austria's prosperity and demographic situation. Examples in this regard are family reunification and the search for international protection. Both family reunification and international protection are highly regulated by international norms and regulations; thus, national regulations are bound by joint developments in this field. It was stressed throughout the discussions that greater EU co-operation in the area of international protection is required, including an increase in the quality of international protection procedures in terms of overall conditions, admission standards and access to education and the labour market for asylum seekers. Furthermore, resettlement policies should be reconsidered. Another type of migration that is less

dependent on economic prosperity is educational migration. Particularly from Germany, it was assumed that flows will pursue due to the eased admission system in Austria compared to the German *numerus clausus* system. At the same time Austria risks losing talented highly-skilled human capital, as it is expected that international competition among educational locations will increase.

Spatial consequences of immigration flows to Austria will largely depend on the size of inflows as well as on the availability of vacant jobs. Urban areas and their surroundings will remain particularly targeted areas for immigrants. Other main areas of destination will be touristic zones as well as regions marked by specific economic specialisations that are in need of specifically skilled labour force. Greater flows of immigrants towards more peripheral regions will be likely to occur only in an 'expansive' scenario, hence if a critical quantitative number of migrants is accompanied by appropriate living conditions and job offers.

### **Migration and the labour market**

In the 'expansive' scenario, labour force demands are expected to occur in each sector due to positive economic growth associated with regressive birth rates. In a 'recessive' scenario, foreign workers are expected to be demanded only in specific labour market segments. Finally, in the 'endogenous' scenario, the access of foreign workers to the labour market would be highly restricted; however, even in this scenario, some form of labour migration is expected to occur. The segmentation of the labour market is regarded as a main causal factor for demand of labour force in this regard. However, serious labour shortages are not likely to occur, as policy measures restricting immigration are commonly loosened by the political sphere when there is a demand for labour force. If migration increases due to economic growth, however, policy action might not be able to keep up, resulting in a 'reaction gap' or 'legislation gap'.

Measures for attracting additional highly-skilled labour force will be most likely to be undertaken in an 'expansive' scenario. Nonetheless, across all three scenarios, 'brain drain' effects of highly-skilled workers are expected to continue. Hence, stimuli for retaining a highly-skilled domestic or foreign workforce will be required in the future in the case of each scenario. For instance, an adaption or extension of the *Red-White-Red-Card* could be an appropriate measure to ease the labour market access of highly-skilled foreigners who have graduated from Austrian universities. More measures could be undertaken in general to tackle unfavourable labour market conditions for highly-skilled persons, such as low entry wages or hampered career opportunities due to prevailing seniority rules.

Throughout all three scenarios, a specific demand will arise for (medium-)skilled labour immigration, less related to economic cycles, but more to structural determinants, such as needs resulting from population ageing (*e.g. care sector*). In this context, it was seen as a particular challenge by the participants to mitigate the level of informality in this segment, which currently renders the foreign workforce into 'real domestic servants'. In a number other branches as well, such as the IT sector, tourism and construction or specific tradesmen such as chimney sweeps and roofers, the foreign labour force will become important for reacting to skill mismatches. In order to respond to labour market needs in this regard, the participants called for more measures to attract and better embed key workers, aiming particularly at activating immigration potentials in additional, perhaps more

distant third countries. At the same time, they stressed that the recognition of skills will have to be facilitated by harmonising recognition procedures so as to lower barriers to accessing the 'regular' labour market. According to the participants, it would also be necessary to lower general administrative obstacles for immigration in this vein. As regards the labour market integration measures of immigrants, specific emphasis will have to be put on securing appropriate language proficiency; thus, affirmative action will have to be carried out.

As regards low-skilled segments, a need for foreign workers will persist not only in an expanding economy, but also in a stagnating economy. In the Austrian society as a whole, younger cohorts tend to be educational climbers, increasingly acquiring higher skilled positions. As a consequence, deficits in lower labour market segments will become apparent, thus providing job opportunities for foreign labour, although such positions are often characterised by low wages, little prestige and unfavourable working times. Such 'trickle-down effects' are closely related to demographic mechanisms. Hence, domestic and foreign workforces are not universally in direct competition in all labour market segments. Thus, domestic labour cannot compensate for an increasing demand for labour force due to restricted availability; nevertheless immigration will remain a decisive factor for population growth. In the future, labour market measures aiming at securing minimum working conditions will be crucial, not only to protect workers, but also to reduce competition and wage dumping and to tackle greater informality and irregularity in the workplace. In general, from an integrative perspective, the better societal and economic embedding of workers with a foreign background constitutes a bundle of multi-faceted challenges. Key words in this regard include: overall diversity management, measures against discrimination, institutional barriers and the insider-outsider segmentation of the labour market.

### **External and internal perceptions of 'immigration country' Austria**

Factors impinging on individuals' migration decisions range from the political, economic and demographic circumstances in countries of origin to the specific (international) context, including alternative countries of destination, individual resources, opportunities and networks. These migration decisions cannot be steered directly by political strategies in Austria. Nevertheless, the image of Austria abroad can largely affect individuals' decisions in the context of labour migration, especially in the highly-skilled segment of the labour market. This image is largely shaped by the notion of the country's labour market conditions, its attractiveness for international business, its welfare system, and its investments in innovation as well as into a research- and education-friendly environment. In an expansive scenario, Austria is expected to remain an attractive country of destination for immigrants. The attractiveness will be less marked in a recessive scenario, but even in such a case, selected employment opportunities would be available for labour migrants. Moreover, in a scenario of unfavourable economic circumstances as well, participants assumed that Austria would still be attractive due to historic and cultural ties with specific countries of origin as well as continuing effects of its earlier reputation. As such, in order to attract highly-skilled and/or specifically skilled labour migrants, enhanced pro-migration policies will have to be pursued. Investments in ameliorating Austria's 'body language' abroad will have to be undertaken. These measures will mainly aim at positioning Austria as an attractive job location, particularly in an expansive or recessive scenario. As regards future labour market potentials, the South-East European

area could further constitute an important region of origin of migration towards Austria, because of the geographical proximity and existing social ‘docking sites’ in the context of existing social networks. Pro-active measures will also have to aim at activating potentials in new regions of origin. Investments in enhancing the individual’s wellbeing will be necessary so as to remain attractive for the target group of specifically skilled and highly-skilled persons. Consulates and embassies could take on more migration management tasks in order to activate appropriate human resources. New models for presenting needs and requirements for working in Austria and for matching them with conditions in a potential region of origin should be elaborated. Transnational or cross-border job portals could also constitute a valuable measure in this context. To approach these goals, closer cooperation between public employment agencies and career centres should be fostered. The establishment of ‘one-stop-shops for migrants’ for providing information on education, childcare, housing etc. could constitute valuable steps towards a harmonised ‘welcome culture’ in Austria.

At the same time, more investments in diversity management will become indispensable in order to avoid social dislocations. If immigration primarily corresponds to labour shortages (*e.g. highly-skilled or skilled workers*), immigration and mobility could be perceived more in a positive light and have a mitigating effect on xenophobic and nationalist attitudes, both within public opinion and the media. However, in a ‘recessive’ or ‘endogenous’ scenario, a lower number of foreign workers will be needed to fill labour shortages; as a result, the foreign workforce could come into more direct competition with the domestic workforce, and xenophobic attitudes may increase. The segmentation of the labour market could also be conducive to nationalist attitudes, despite economic prosperity. In this sense, policy action is clearly needed, as more diversified migration and mobility flows will lead to greater societal diversity.

### **A holistic and cross-sectional approach to migration**

From a generic point of view, participants found that a more systemic approach is needed to tackle migration-related policy challenges, regarding both controllable as well as less controllable migration flows. Hence, holistic approaches will become increasingly important by putting greater emphasis on systemic and cross-sectional perspectives. In this sense, as it is substantially intertwined with a range of other policy arenas, migration policies cannot be perceived as a stand-alone policy arena. Migration itself can be understood as one system among others that affects further systems such as the economy, social cohesion, the health and welfare system or the educational system. In parallel, those systems are marked by specific needs for international migration and might also influence migration policies. Greater migration and integration mainstreaming as well as awareness-raising appear to be pivotal future challenges. In general, policies should strive to take a more a longer-term perspective so as to create a greater systemic and multi-focal conceptualisation. Thus, an ‘overall strategy’ is needed that reflects on different possible directions and long-term developments.

Table 2: Key features of the elaborated scenarios

Drivers	1 Expansive / Positive Scenario	2 Recessive / Negative Scenario	3 Endogenous / Wild Card Scenario	Common features across scenarios
Economic Cycle(s)	high economic growth towards greater EU integration increasing international interrelations	stagnating economic growth towards an 'EU of competitiveness' decreasing international interrelations	high economic growth increasing encapsulation only limited international interrelations	disputable: mere focus on growth in quantitative terms embedding in international context is decisive ( <i>relative growth to EU, neighbouring countries, global positioning</i> ) economic situation in countries of origin as influencing variable
Demography	low fertility high life expectancy population ageing	low fertility high life expectancy population ageing	high fertility high life expectancy	population ageing & increasing life expectancy demographic situation in countries of origin as influencing variable
Segmented Labour Market	enhanced demand for foreign workforce, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>distinct segmentation along high-skilled/low-skilled and knowledge-intensive/work-intensive</li> <li>rise of specific segments, e.g. high-tech, IT, care</li> </ul> continuing brain drain	selective demand for foreign workforce, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>low-skilled segments</li> <li>need in specific segments, e.g. care</li> </ul> greater competition at the labour market, more informality accelerated brain drain	very limited demand for foreign workforce, e.g.: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>need in specific segments, e.g. care</li> </ul>	some additional, foreign workforce will be requested throughout all scenarios brain drain will constitute a general future challenge
Public Opinion / Society	increasing attractiveness as an immigration country growing diversity greater openness towards migration	decreasing attractiveness as an immigration country rising xenophobic attitudes	decreasing attractiveness as an immigration country rising xenophobic attitudes	public opinion is particularly dependent on labour market needs and the related degree of competition among domestic and foreign workforce, as well as strongly influenced by media appearance and policy action
	↓	↓	↓	↓
International migration dynamics	increasing labour migration/mobility continued other migration flows ( <i>e.g. student migration, family migration</i> ) enhanced diversification of regions of origin spill-over effects of migration flows to peripheral regions within Austria	labour migration in specific sectors continued other migration flows ( <i>e.g. student migration, family migration</i> ) more 'informal' migration distinct concentration of migration flows within Austria enhanced emigration of highly-skilled persons	very limited labour migration continued other migration flows ( <i>e.g. student migration, family migration</i> ) more 'informal' migration distinct concentration of migration flows within Austria	continued migration flows, <i>e.g. family reunification, asylum seekers, commuters, ...</i>

	continuing emigration of highly-skilled persons			
<b>Political Strategy towards migration</b>	pro-immigration policies, aiming at activating new regions of origin facilitation of recognition of skills focus on language proficiency expanding welfare system more measures for equilibrating labour market conditions	only selective pro-migration policies, aiming at activating specifically skilled and highly-skilled workforce preventive measures against 'undesired' migration more rigid regulations for immigration reduced free movement aggravated access to residence permits	more rigid regulations for immigration preventive measures against 'undesired' migration reduced free movement aggravated access to residence permits	pro-active immigration policies will mainly aim at fostering labour migration not competing with the domestic workforce migration policies are systemically linked to other policy fields, having direct or indirect mutual impact, <i>e.g. health, welfare system, education ...</i>

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## ANNEX 1: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

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<b>Peter Huber</b>	Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung	Expert
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<b>Katerina Kratzmann</b>	Internationale Organisation für Migration, Wien	Expert
<b>Florian Kraushofer</b>	Österreichische HochschülerInnenschaft	Civil Society
<b>Margit Kreuzhuber</b>	Wirtschaftskammer Österreich	Expert
<b>Stephan Marik-Lebeck</b>	Statistik Austria	Expert
<b>Alejandro Pena</b>	****	Civil Society
<b>David Reichel</b>	International Centre for Migration Policy Development	Expert
<b>Christoph Reinprecht</b>	Universität Wien, Inst. für Soziologie	Expert
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<b>Elisabeth Stix</b>	Österreichische Raumordnungskonferenz	Expert

### *Participation not possible:*

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<b>Nicolaus Drimmel</b>	Österr. Gemeindebund	Decision Maker
<b>Kenan Güngör</b>	Think difference	Expert
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<b>Elisabeth Musil</b>	Universität Wien, Inst. für Geographie und Regionalforschung	<i>Moderator</i>
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## ANNEX 2: AGENDA


### SEEMIG Workshop „Future Migration Scenarios for Austria: Migration – Demography – Labour Market“

Austrian Academy of Sciences,  
Dr. Ignaz Seipel-Platz 2, 1010 Vienna  
13 January 2014, 9 am – 4 pm

8.30-9.00	<i>Arrival &amp; Registration</i>
9.00-9.30	<b>Welcome &amp; Introduction</b>  Welcome ( <i>Heinz Fassmann</i> ) Short overview on international migration in Austria ( <i>Elisabeth Musil</i> ) Foresight method and schedule of the workshop ( <i>Kathrin Gruber</i> )
9.30-11.00	<b><u>Session 1: Key drivers of migration</u></b> Moderation: <i>Heinz Fassmann</i>  <i>Plenary discussion</i>
11.00-11.15	<i>Coffee/tea break</i>
11.15-13.00	<b><u>Session 2: Scenario development: processes &amp; geographies</u></b> Moderation: <i>Ramon Bauer, Kathrin Gruber, Alois Humer, Elisabeth Musil</i>  <i>Elaboration in Working Groups</i>
13:00-14.00	<i>Lunch</i>
14.00-14:45	<b><u>Session 3: Presentation and discussion of scenarios</u></b> Moderation: <i>Heinz Fassmann</i>  <i>Plenary discussion</i>
14.45-15.50	<b><u>Session 4: Implications for migration policy</u></b> Moderation: <i>Heinz Fassmann</i>  <i>Plenary discussion</i>
15:50-16:00	<b>Wrap up &amp; outlook</b> ( <i>Kathrin Gruber/Elisabeth Musil</i> )

## ANNEX 3: ADDITIONAL MATERIAL

Figure 4: Drivers of migration in countries of origin and destination



Source: SEEMIG Foresight Workshop Austria, based on Fassmann 2009a:12

**Table 3: Overview on outcomes of scenarios 1a 'Mobility Model' and 1b 'Boom'**

1 Expansive / Positive Scenario	Economy in AT / EU / international	Demography / society	Labour market	Migration policies
1a Mobility Scenario  <i>(Group A)</i>	prospering Austrian economy growth equally to the EU level convergence-focused approach within AT interlaced economic area across borders increasing EU harmonisation EU as global player more cross-border interrelations more cosmopolites & commuters	population ageing need for additional labour force  <b>society:</b> less populist views constant/ expanding welfare system reduction of working hours balancing wage levels fostering education & research	demand for foreign labour force in high-skilled and low skilled segmentation along knowledge-intensive and work-intensive rise of some specific segments (high-tech, IT, care...)	increasing application of image-producing & 'pro-migration' policies facilitation of recognition of qualifications & proof of skills support of self-employment focus on language proficiency
1b Boom Scenario  <i>(Group B)</i>	prospering Austrian economy growth above the EU level increasing harmonisation at EU level situation in countries of origin decisive for migration decision	population ageing need for additional labour force  <b>society:</b> growing diversity expanded welcome-culture less islamophobic views expanding welfare system policies aiming at balancing wage levels	demand for foreign labour force in high-skilled and low skilled need for skilled foreign workforce in specific segments more irregular jobs	increasing application of image-producing policies more pro-migration policies addressing 'new' third countries facilitation of recognition of qualifications

Table 4: Overview on outcomes of scenarios 2a 'Post-colonial Model' and 2b 'Doom'

2 Recessive / Negative Scenario	Economy in AT / EU / international	Demography / society	Labour market	Migration policies
<p>2a Post-colonial Scenario</p> <p>(Group A)</p>	<p>whole EU area marked by stagnating economic development</p> <p>EU of competitiveness</p> <p>advancing regional disparities</p> <p>rather unattractive location for business</p> <p>limited innovation</p> <p>blooming of some alternative niches</p> <p>increasing subsistence economy</p>	<p>population ageing</p> <p>selective demand for additional labour force</p> <p><b>society:</b></p> <p>rise of xenophobic attitudes</p> <p>widening gaps between rich and poor</p> <p>aggravated conditions for participating in welfare system</p> <p>strive for education as a key to better jobs</p>	<p>collapse of some branches</p> <p>only limited for additional labour force:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>only tourism expanding, offering seasonal jobs for foreign labour force</li> <li>only demand for low-skilled foreign labour force</li> </ul> <p>women &amp; young facing difficulties in accessing the labour market</p> <p>lowering wage levels</p> <p>hidden unemployment rising</p> <p>increasing share of entrepreneurs with foreign background, at least in some niches</p> <p>accelerated brain drain effects</p>	<p>no active measures for attracting immigrants</p> <p>more rigid regulations for immigration</p>
<p>2b Doom Scenario</p> <p>(Group B)</p>	<p>towards a 'fortress Austria'</p> <p>whole EU area marked by stagnating economic development</p> <p>enhanced economic disintegration</p>	<p>retirement of 'baby-boomers'</p> <p>population ageing</p> <p>selective demand for additional labour force</p> <p><b>society:</b></p> <p>rise of xenophobic attitudes</p> <p>exclusion of foreigners from social benefits</p> <p>societal partitioning</p> <p>social tensions</p>	<p>intensified segmentation of the labour market</p> <p>increased unemployment, particularly of foreigners</p> <p>filling labour market gaps by qualification measures</p> <p>demand for low-skilled foreign labour force</p> <p>demand for foreign labour force in some key segments like care services</p> <p>wage dumping effects</p>	<p>no active measures for attracting immigrants</p> <p>reduced free movement</p> <p>preventive measures against 'undesired' migration</p> <p>aggravated access to residence permits</p>

**Table 5: Overview on outcomes of scenarios 3a ‘Scandinavian/Swiss Model’ and 3b ‘Sinking Island’**

3 Recessive / Negative Scenario	Economy in AT / EU / international	Demography / society	Labour market	Migration policies
3a Scandinavian / Swiss Scenario  <i>(Group A)</i>	weakening Austrian economy encapsulation of Austria because of energy autarky or implosion of the EU focus on national economic development inward-oriented and reactive behaviour only little export-orientation, but some remaining international ties	very limited demand for additional work force  <b>society:</b> increasing fertility rates due to changed gender regimes, either: collaborative division of family duties, or ‘woman’s place is in the home’ mentality	hardly demand for foreign workforce largely recourse to domestic workforce	no active measures for attracting immigrants or even preventive measures
3b Sinking Island Scenario  <i>(Group B)</i>	weakening Austrian economy EU area marked by recessive development encapsulation of Austria because of dissolution of the EU increasing bunker mentality some co-operations remain, e.g. with DE and SEE distinct exposure to surrounding developments	great demographic changeovers very limited demand for additional workforce  <b>society:</b> shifts towards family care no direct effects of demographic changeovers on labour markets, but increased ‘undisclosed reserves’ and decreased female economic activity	hardly demand for foreign workforce largely recourse to domestic workforce growing tendencies towards traditional handcraft	no active measures for attracting immigrants shielding effects and closed borders aggravated immigration regulations

## ANNEX 4: IMPRESSIONS FROM THE WORKSHOP

